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INTRODUCTION
This Article begins with several founding observations about the inclusion of
racial minorities in twenty-first-century democracy. First, the current legal
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framework for protecting voting rights in the United States has been dramatically
destabilized by Supreme Court decisions that reinterpret the protections against
minority vote dilution and require rethinking to survive modern challenges. While
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA)1 was founded with the clear purpose of
increasing the voice and power of minority voters through their aggregation in
majority-minority districts, in a post-Shaw v. Reno2 and Miller v. Johnson3 world, race
is no longer allowed as the “predominant factor” in redistricting decisions. The
Supreme Court has suggested alternatives ranging from a wholesale abandonment
of racial classification to the adoption of race-neutral criteria that nevertheless
satisfy VRA requirements. But a coherent doctrine to guide lower courts’ efforts
to protect racial minorities constituting communities of common interest has not
yet materialized. The result has been what one scholar terms “an existential crisis”4
and another scholar terms a “doctrinal interregnum” with uncertain results for
minority voters and voting rights jurisprudence alike.5
At the same time, the nation itself has undergone dramatic changes in the
racial composition of its polity and in the complexity and salience of race as a
factor in political life. The fact that we now have a “wise Latina” Justice, a
southern black conservative Justice, and a biracial President who is commonly
identified with “post-racial” politics speaks to the demonstrable change in tenor
and substance since the VRA’s passage in 1965, even as democratic inclusion
remains an enduring challenge. In this Article, we focus on a relatively
unexamined constituent of this complex modern racial diversity that illustrates
some of the core features that all minority groups face in continuing VRA
challenges: Asian Americans.6 Herein lies the dilemma of Asian American
democratic exclusion. In population numbers, Asian Americans have been the
fastest growing racial minority group in the United States over the last few
decades. As of 2010, a larger share of new immigrants to the United States come
from Asia than from any other region of the world. Yet at the same time, Asian
Americans are underrepresented in almost every measure of political
incorporation, from ballot boxes to the hallowed halls of government. This claim
may raise the eyebrows of those who adhere to prevailing perceptions of Asian
Americans as a “model minority” and those who can recall high profile instances
of Asian Americans in elected and appointed offices—such as Steven Chu, Nikki
Haley, Bobby Jindal, Gary Locke, and the six Asian Americans newly elected to

1. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
2. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
3. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911–27 (1995).
4. Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Section 2 Is Dead: Long Live Section 2, 160 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA
219, 219 (2012).
5. Heather K. Gerken, Rashomon and the Roberts Court, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1213, 1213 (2007).
6. “Asian Americans” refers to Americans of Asian descent. Unless stated otherwise, the
Article refers to naturalized Asian Americans who are eligible to vote in federal elections.
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Congress in 2012.7 Yet widely accepted measures of political incorporation used to
assess voter participation and electoral representation reveal that Asian Americans
remain stubbornly and conspicuously underrepresented: a situation that impedes
the realization of the VRA’s promises to eliminate racial discrimination in voting
and to promote democratic inclusion.
In the face of apparent political disempowerment, it is curious that Asian
Americans have very rarely succeeded in invoking section 2 of the VRA,8 a legal
measure devised specifically to bolster minority political power. Is this because the
necessary conditions for a successful political challenge have not yet arisen? Is the
problem a structural one implicating institutional design (a legal problem)? Or is it
some combination of both, indicating the double harm of a permanent political
minority without ability to secure legal redress under the VRA? What, if anything,
should be done to strike an appropriate balance between protecting minority
interests and majoritarian principles of democracy when election law has moved
away from racial complexity as the world has moved toward it?
Social science and legal scholarship suggest that the legal standards used to
trigger the special protections of the VRA contain underspecified assumptions
about political behavior and oversimplified understandings about racial identity.9
This Article attempts to mobilize insights about the political behavior of racial
minorities in the service of a multidimensional approach toward thinking about
legal remedies for democratic exclusion. Our core contention is that the problem
of democratic exclusion is multifactorial and requires a multipronged approach to
redress. Such an approach includes augmenting available data about the political
participation of racial minorities, refining empirical measures to reflect racial
politics in a complex, multiracial electorate, and revisiting available remedies in
light of a problem with both political and legal dimensions.
Our multistep argument proceeds in several parts. Part I provides a brief
background on the VRA’s goal of bolstering minority political power. Parts II and
7. The six officials elected to Congress in 2012 were Ami Berry, Tammy Duckworth, Mazie
Hirono, Tulsi Gabbard, Grace Meng, and Mark Takano. APAICS Congratulates New Asian American
and Pacific Islander Members of 113th US Congress, ASIAN PAC. AM. INST. FOR CONG. STUD. (Nov. 7
2012), http://www.apaics.org/index.php/news_media/apaics_congratulates_new_asian_american_and
_pacific_islander_members_o.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006). Little scholarly work has considered why so few section 2 claims
have been brought on behalf of Asian Americans. We take the scarcity of claims as a given for
purposes of this Article, although the question merits further investigation.
9. Several influential articles describing this difficulty and calling for improved scholarly
approaches have issued from law professors who are also social scientists, including Laura E. Gómez,
A Tale of Two Genres: On the Real and Ideal Links Between Law and Society and Critical Race Theory, in THE
BLACKWELL COMPANION TO LAW AND SOCIETY 453 (Austin Sarat ed., 2004), Laura E. Gómez,
Looking for Race in All the Wrong Places, 46 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 221 (2012), Laura E. Gómez,
Understanding Law and Race as Mutually Constitutive: An Invitation to Explore an Emerging Field, 6 ANN.
REV. LAW & SOC. SCI. 487 (2010), and Osagie K. Obasagoie, Race in Law and Society: A Critique, in
RACE, LAW AND SOCIETY 445 (Ian Haney López ed., 2006). Many of the articles in this special issue
respond to that call.
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III examine the fit, or rather the misfit, of Asian American political attitudes and
voting behavior with the VRA’s legal standards. Despite the bleak picture of Asian
American political participation painted in Part IV, this Article suggests important
shortcomings in traditional means of establishing the empirical grounds for
leveraging section 2. Part III presents improved data from an original survey that
suggests that Asian American voters merit legal protections under the VRA given
commonalities that are as relevant as they are overlooked. Thus, Asian Americans
constitute a “negative case” of democratic inclusion in the social science sense that
the tests designed to identify and remedy political disempowerment fail to
recognize the needs of Asian American voters. Part IV proposes a more nuanced
approach to understanding both “racial identities” and “political interests”—one
that avoids conceptual problems of racial essentialism while respecting genuine
between-group and within-group differences revealed in empirical data. It then
builds on the “positive case” for Asian American inclusion by presenting evidence
of such shared interests in support of an emerging legal doctrine that communities
of common interest merit heightened protection under section 2’s voting dilution
protections. Part V concludes by reflecting on the normative implications of
reforming democratic institutions tasked with promoting equal political
opportunity and by entertaining objections to the larger undertaking of reforming
the VRA section 2 specifically.
I. VOTING RIGHTS ACT, SECTION 2: MINORITY VOTING DILUTION
AND PROTECTION OF COMMUNITIES OF COMMON INTEREST
The history of the VRA encapsulates the long march of American
democracy toward freedom and equality. Following years of disenfranchising laws
in the form of poll taxes, literacy tests, vouchers for good moral character,
disqualifications for crimes of moral turpitude, and white primaries, African
American voters in formerly Confederate states were almost completely
disenfranchised. Congress passed civil rights legislation in 1957, 1960, and 1964
that contained voting-related provisions.10 Although these laws made it more
difficult for states to keep all of their black citizens disenfranchised, the case-bycase litigation proved to be slow and often ineffectual.11 Formal and informal

10. The 1957 Act created the Civil Rights Division within the Department of Justice and the
Commission on Civil Rights; the Attorney General was given authority to intervene in and institute
lawsuits seeking injunctive relief against violations of the Fifteenth Amendment. Civil Rights Act of
1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 and 42
U.S.C.). The 1960 Act permitted federal courts to appoint voting referees to conduct voter
registration following a judicial finding of voting discrimination. Civil Rights Act of 1960, Pub. L. No.
86-449, 74 Stat. 86 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 20, and 42 U.S.C.). The 1964 Act
also contained several relatively minor voting-related provisions. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No.
88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 and 42 U.S.C.).
11. See S. REP. NO. 89-162, pt. 3, at 6 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2508, 2544
(“Experience has shown that the case-by-case litigation approach will not solve the voting
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practices kept black registration rates extremely low in Alabama, Louisiana, and
Mississippi, and well below white registration rates in the other southern states.12
These deficits of commitment and implementation were met with renewed
mobilization and dauntless non-violent direct action. Perhaps the defining
moment of this sustained groundswell occurred on “Bloody Sunday,” March 7,
1965, in Selma, Alabama when a detachment of state troopers and local police
descended upon peaceful marchers with gas masks, billy clubs, blue hard hats, on
horseback. Images of the brutality captured in media images shocked the
conscience of a nation and persuaded President Lyndon B. Johnson to take swift
action. Within months, with “the outrage of Selma still fresh,”13 the President
called for the attorney general “to write me the goddamn best, toughest voting rights act
that you can devise.”14 With public opinion on their side, Congress and the
President overcame Southern resistance to the strengthened legislation that would
become the VRA.
The VRA abolished numerous voting practices and procedures designed to
disenfranchise African American voters. section 2 is a permanent measure adopted
to prohibit practices that deny or abridge the right to vote on the basis of race.15 It
applies nationwide, therefore allowing the Attorney General or private plaintiffs to
challenge discriminatory practices in areas of the country not covered by section 5
(a measure that only applies within covered jurisdictions),16 and proscribes a
variety of discriminatory practices. As President Johnson said upon signing the
legislation, “This law covers many pages, but the heart of the act is plain.
Wherever, by clear and objective standards, States and counties are using
regulations, or laws, or tests to deny the right to vote, then they will be struck
down.”17 section 5 tends to receive more scholarly attention than section 2 in light
of the recurring congressional reauthorizations required for the temporary

discrimination problem”); see also Chandler Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: A Brief History, in
CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN PERSPECTIVE 7, 11–13
(Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992).
12. Id. at 13.
13. Remarks in the Capitol Rotunda at the Signing of the Voting Rights Act, 2 PUB. PAPERS
840, 841 (Aug. 6, 1965) [hereinafter Remarks in the Capitol Rotunda].
14. RANDALL B. WOODS, LBJ: ARCHITECT OF AMERICAN AMBITION 480 (2006) (emphasis
added).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006). The Congressional Record of VRA section 2 and its subsequent
amendments does not go into great detail about its rationale for including the non-black racial
minority groups. More direct information about the inclusion of non-black minorities and language
minority groups can be gleaned from histories surrounding the adoption of section 203 during the
1975 Amendments. See infra notes 81–109 and accompanying text for more information about the
history of electoral exclusion of Asian Americans that justifies their protection under the VRA; see also
Terry Ao Minnis, Asian Americans and Redistricting: The Emerging Voice, 13 J.L. SOC’Y 23, 34–36 (2011)
(providing examples of redistricting practices that have diluted the voting power of Asian Americans).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2006).
17. Remarks in the Capitol Rotunda, supra note 13.
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measure and recent Supreme Court litigation.18 The focus of this Article, however,
is on section 2. Many of the cases arising under section 2—once amended in
1975— involve challenges to redistricting on the basis that proposed district lines
dilute minority voting power. Section 2’s prohibition against discrimination in
voting, however, applies more broadly to any voting standard, practice, or
procedure that results in denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen to vote
on account of race, color, or membership in a language minority group. These
proscriptions collectively prohibit institutions and rules that result in protected
minority group members having “less opportunity than other residents in the
district to participate in the political process and to elect legislators of their
choice.”19 Thus, the functional goal of section 2 is to ensure procedural fairness,
not to guarantee a specific result. Fairness is defined as equal opportunity to achieve
political representation, not the result of proportionate representation.20 Still,
proportionality is often used as an indicator of fairness in redistricting.21 A rule or
redistricting plan is considered unfair if it leads to the systematic exclusion or
severe underrepresentation of a protected group; it is considered fair if a minority
group could plausibly elect its candidate of choice.22
Ultimately, the fairness of a rule in the context of redistricting is an empirical
determination guided by factors enumerated in the Senate Report accompanying
the VRA and subsequent case law interpreting those requirements.23 While the
Supreme Court in Mobile v. Bolden tried to limit the scope of the VRA to
intentional discrimination in redistricting (section 5),24 Congress examined the
history of litigation under section 2 since 1965 and clarified in the 1982 renewal to
the VRA that section 2 would consider discriminatory effects to run afoul of the
statute. Congress established an amended section 2 results test consisting of nine
18. Shelby County v. Holder is being considered in the 2012 Supreme Court term. The case was
argued on February 27, 2013, although the Court has not issued an opinion as this Article goes to
press. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012) (mem.), granting cert. to 679 F.3d 848 (D.C. Cir.
2012). Updates for this case appear at Shelby County v. Holder, SCOTUSBLOG,
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/shelby-county-v-holder (last visited Mar. 31, 2013).
19. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 766 (1973).
20. H.R. REP. NO. 97-227, at 30, 48 (1982) (“It would be illegal for an at-large election scheme
for a particular state or local body to permit a bloc voting majority over a substantial period of time
consistently to defeat minority candidates or candidates identified with the interests of a racial or
language minority,” but “[t]he fact that members of a racial or language minority group have not been
elected in numbers equal to the group’s proportion of the population does not, in itself, constitute a
violation of the section . . . .”); S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 82 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177
(incorporating language from White v. Regester into the section 2 definition that acknowledges the need
for equal political opportunity, while including provisos against proportional representation); see also
James F. Blumstein, Defining and Proving Race Discrimination: Perspectives on the Purpose vs. Result Approach
from the Voting Rights Act, 69 VA. L. REV. 633, 691–95 (1983).
21. See Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1000 (1994).
22. S. REP NO. 97-417, at 28–29 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 207.
23. Id.
24. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 64 (1980) (holding that section 2 of the original
VRA was a restatement and codification of the protections afforded by the Fifteenth Amendment).
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“Senate factors” to consider in determining whether the “totality of the
circumstances” has a discriminatory effect: (1) the extent of any history of official
discrimination in the state or political subdivision that touches the right of
minority voters to register, vote, or otherwise participate in the democratic
process; (2) the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political
subdivision is racially polarized; (3) the extent to which voting in the elections of
the state or political subdivision has used unusually large election districts, majority
vote requirements, or other voting practices that enhance the opportunity for
discrimination; (4) whether minorities have been denied access to a candidate
slating process (if there is one); (5) the extent to which minorities in the
subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in education, employment, and
health, which hinders their ability to participate in the political process;
(6) whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial
appeals; (7) the extent to which minority group members have been elected to
public office; (8) whether there is significant lack of responsiveness on the part of
elected officials to particularized needs of the minority group; and (9) whether the
policies underlying voting prerequisites are tenuous.25 The Senate factors were
further specified by the Supreme Court in Thornburg v. Gingles, which lays out the
standards that are still commonly used in voting rights litigation today.26 Under the
Gingles test, minorities demonstrate dilution through submergence if they can
show the following: (1) they are sufficiently large and geographically compact to
constitute a majority in a single-member district; (2) there is political cohesion
within the minority group, typically by showing that a significant number of
minority group members usually vote for the same candidate; and (3) the white
majority votes sufficiently as a block to enable it to usually defeat the minority
voters’ preferred candidate.27 As voting rights scholar Samuel Issacharoff has said,
“Gingles brought the racially polarized voting inquiry into the undisputed and
unchallenged center of the Voting Rights Act, making proof of racial bloc voting
the touchstone of a section 2 claim of voting dilution.”28
Shortly after Gingles, a flurry of lawsuits arose challenging redistricting within
at-large districts and expanding voter protections. The expansion of voting

25. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28–29, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 206–07.
26. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 36 (1986).
27. Id. at 89–90. Justice Brennan derives the three-part Gingles test for determining dilution
from several scholarly articles, most notably James Blacksher & Larry Menefee, From Reynolds v.
Sims to City of Mobile v. Bolden: Have the White Suburbs Commandeered the Fifteenth Amendment?,
34 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 58–61 (1982). Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47. He did so in lieu of direct reliance on the
legislative history of section 2 (which itself distilled case law such as White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755
(1973), and Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc)). See S. REP NO. 97-417, at
17–24 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 194–202.
28. SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., LAW OF DEMOCRACY 770 (2d ed. 2001) (quoting Samuel
Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90
MICH. L. REV. 1833, 1851 (1989)).
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protections, however, stalled in Shaw 29 and Miller.30 In Shaw, the Court held that
race-conscious redistricting raises equality concerns under the Fourteenth
Amendment, creating a tension between aggressive VRA enforcement and colorblind equal protection jurisprudence.31 The Court recognized that state legislatures
are often cognizant of race when they create districts, just as they are cognizant of
other distinguishing characteristics such as age, economic status, religion, political
affiliation, and other demographic factors.32 But with regard to race, legislators
trying to draw fair districts faced a dilemma. Historically, the legal system has
played an important role in defining the election laws that in turn condition
politics, given the Court’s longstanding intervention to clear political lockups and
to protect discrete and insular minorities in particular. Now legislators must try to
boost minority electoral power in order to comply with the VRA voting dilution
provisions and yet they need to avoid running afoul of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s cautions about racial classifications after Shaw. The Supreme
Court’s concerns about the use of racial classifications in redistricting intensified
after Miller.33 In Miller, the Court recognized the importance of acknowledging
race for fulfilling the VRA and recognized that communities with “common
threads of relevant interests” may have a distinctive racial makeup.34 But the Court
then limited the uses of race so that race could not be a “predominant factor”
motivating the legislature’s districting plan.35 To show this impermissible use of
race after Miller, the Court majority said a plaintiff must prove that “the legislature
subordinated traditional race-neutral districting principles, including but not
limited to compactness, contiguity, respect for political subdivisions or communities
defined by actual shared interests, to racial considerations.”36
However, the majority opinion does not define the communities or shared
interests that merit deference in line-drawing and discusses the notion of
communities of common interest (CCI) with reservation:
[T]he State’s districting legislation [cannot] be rescued by mere recitation
of purported communities of interest. . . . A State is free to recognize
communities that have a particular racial makeup, provided its action is
directed toward some common thread of relevant interests. . . . But where
the State assumes from a group of voters’ race that they “think alike,
share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
Shaw, 509 U.S. at 653–58.
Id. at 646.
Miller, 515 U.S. at 911–27.
Id. at 920.
Id. at 918.
Id. at 916 (emphasis added).
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the polls,” it engages in racial stereotyping at odds with equal protection
mandates.37
At odds with the concern for racial stereotyping in the majority opinion, a
dissenting opinion authored by Justice Ginsburg argues for the ongoing relevance
of race and ethnicity in the course of considering communities of interest:
Along with attention to size, shape, and political subdivisions, the Court
recognizes as an appropriate districting principle, “respect for . . .
communities defined by actual shared interests.” The Court finds no
community here, however, because a report in the record showed
“fractured political, social, and economic interests within the Eleventh
District’s black population.” But ethnicity itself can tie people together, as
volumes of social science literature have documented—even people with
divergent economic interests. For this reason, ethnicity is a significant
force in political life.38
In Miller, the Court recognized the importance of acknowledging race for
fulfilling the VRA but somewhat paradoxically limited the use of race so that it
could not be a “predominant factor” in districting.39 Historically, the legal system
has played an important role in defining the voting rights laws that in turn
condition politics, given federal courts’ longstanding exception to the usual rule of
avoiding political controversies in order to clear political lockups and to protect
discrete and insular minorities in particular. This role stands in tension with the
stance outlined by Justice Kennedy in Miller: “[T]he judiciary retains an
independent obligation in adjudicating consequent equal protection challenges [to
racial gerrymandering claims] to ensure that the State’s actions are narrowly
tailored to achieve a compelling interest . . . [and] in enforcing the constitutional
limits on race-based official action.”40
Since the fractured Miller opinion, the Supreme Court has offered little
guidance to legislatures and lower courts regarding how much emphasis to place
on race when adopting so-called traditional redistricting principles that include
communities of interest.41 As Stephen Malone indicated in a law review article
published shortly after Miller,
On one hand, consideration of race is unconstitutional if it is the
predominant factor. On the other hand, the intentional consideration of
race and deliberate creation of districts with a certain racial composition

37. Id. at 919–20 (quoting Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647).
38. Id. at 944 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 918.
40. Id. at 922.
41. See, for example, Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 966–70 (1996), and Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S.
899, 906–08 (1996), two Supreme Court cases addressing the required timing of considering
communities of interest without addressing the definition or identification of communities of interest.
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may be acceptable if the district genuinely is drawn in the name of
recognizing a community of interest.42
Until Miller, few if any lower courts recognized communities of interest in
vote dilution cases.43 That situation remained largely unchanged after Miller given
the Supreme Court’s opaque reasoning on race and communities of interest.
Accordingly, many predicted the demise of CCI in response to these halting
judicial developments.44 However, reflecting the dissenting opinion in Miller’s
recognition that ethnicity could properly be part of a community of interest
42. Stephen J. Malone, Recognizing Communities of Interest in a Legislative Apportionment Plan, 83
VA. L. REV. 461–62 (1997).
43. District Court decisions preceding Miller mostly declined to recognize communities of
common interest. For example, in Burton v. Sheheen, the District Court of South Carolina noted,
[W]hile we do not intend to minimize the important historic and cultural differences which
exist between blacks and whites, the color of one’s skin, in and of itself, does not create a
community of interest. Rather, a community’s views on crime, employment, education, police brutality,
urban sprawl, or urban blight may be just as indicative of a community of interest as whether
the members of the community are predominantly black or white or the geometric
boundaries of the geographical area. Thus, a community of interest may reflect all of these
factors and will vary depending on the legislative body under consideration.
793 F. Supp. 1329, 1357 (D.S.C. 1992) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted), vacated sub nom. Campbell
v. Theodore, 508 U.S. 968 (1993).
In a very early case, Major v. Treen, 574 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. La. 1983), the District Court struck
down a new district for violating VRA section 2, explaining that the district meant “[d]iscordant
communities of interest, those of New Orleans’ older, urban core and its surrounding suburban
neighborhoods, are joined. . . . [W]hen coupled with the phenomenon of racially polarized voting, this
combination of factors operated to minimize, cancel or dilute black voting strength.” Id. at 353–54
(footnote omitted). In doing so, it cited voting rights scholar Richard Morrill:
Citizens vote, in part, according to their identification with various interests, for example,
religious values, occupation, class, or rural or urban orientation. There is a strong basis in
arguing that “effective representation” or influence on the outcome is enhanced by
grouping of like interests together. . . . This is constitutionally required only with respect to
race. The geographer will also observe that districts which correspond somewhat to nodal
regions, a core urban area and its economic or cultural hinderland united by transportation
and communications, will have a greater sense of unity, awareness of common problems,
and, perhaps, participation than districts which arbitrarily combine disparate areas and
ignore patterns of regional identity and loyalty.
Id. at 354 n.37 (quoting RICHARD MORRILL, POLITICAL REDISTRICTING AND GEOGRAPHIC
THEORY 23 (1981)). For more pre-Miller cases considering communities of interest, see Malone, supra
note 42, at 467–70. Cain & Miller, infra note 112, enumerate thirty-eight section 2 cases concerning
non-black minority voters in the years between 1985 and 1997 in the appendix to their book chapter.
In Ellen Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination in Voting: Judicial Findings Under Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act Since 1982, 39 U. MICH J.L. REFORM 643, 656 (2007), Ellen Katz, along with researchers
from the University of Michigan’s Voting Rights Initiative, lists more than three hundred section 2
cases concerning black and non-black minority voters until 2007 (including lower court cases that
would result in Supreme Court litigation in League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry,
548 U.S. 399 (2006)), with coding of party attributes and legal claims, plus supplemental discussion in
a comprehensive spreadsheet available online at Ellen Katz, Voting Rights Initiative Database Master List
(Section 2 Litigation: 1982–2005), VOTING RTS. INITIATIVE, http://www.sitemaker.umich.edu/
votingrights/files/masterlist.xls (last visited Mar. 31, 2013).
44. See Jackson Williams, The Courts and Partisan Gerrymandering: Recent Cases on Legislative
Reapportionment, 18 S. ILL. U. L.J. 563, 578 (1994) (writing that, after Shaw v. Reno, “[t]he Court’s
rationale in condemning ‘racial gerrymandering’ meanwhile, may indicate a death-knell for another
neutral principle, the community of interest”).
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analysis, a few circuit courts took notice and found promising evidence of
communities of interest in cases concerning Latino and Asian American voters.
For example, the Tenth Circuit in Sanchez v. Colorado held that Colorado’s
legislature had failed to recognize a community of interest among Latino voters
because, unlike unlawful districts where “individuals were selected solely on the
basis of their race, raising the specter of a new genre of political apartheid,”45
plaintiffs attempted to bring together “Hispanic voters who also live in
geographically connected areas that share the same agricultural and rural communities of
interest, along with various socioeconomic concerns.”46 The same concept was recognized
by a district court in New York in the context of Asian Americans claiming
common interests in the Chinatowns of Manhattan and Brooklyn despite their
geographic separation by boroughs in Diaz v. Silver.47 The Fifth Circuit similarly
found a community of interest among Asian Americans in Chen v. City of Houston,
which upheld a redistricting plan because there was both anecdotal and statistical
evidence within a district—demonstrating similar income, low quality housing,
percentage of persons on public relief, occurrence of illiteracy—and specific
factors demonstrating that this district’s concerns differed from those of a planned
community elsewhere.48 Similar factors for demonstrating CCI under state law
have succeeded in California and Michigan during the 2011 redistricting cycle.49
A promising 2006 Supreme Court case indicates that the community of
interest doctrine endures and may have important consequences for non-black
racial minorities such as Latinos and Asian Americans. Because the meaning and
purpose of the doctrine is under-theorized and largely unsettled, however, the
effects of increased usage are hard to predict without greater clarity on CCI
jurisprudence. In League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry (LULAC),
minority voters and interest groups challenged the Texas state legislature’s
redistricting plan following the 2000 census, on grounds that it violated VRA
section 2.50 The Texas legislature’s redistricting plan made changes to two districts
in a manner that would protect the Equal Protection Clause and VRA section 2.
Most significantly, Texas’s Plan 1374C made changes to District 23 (in west
Texas) and District 25 (previously inclusive of Houston in south Texas, but now
including a north-south strip from Austin to the Rio Grande Valley).51 Plan
1374C’s changes to District 23 served the dual goals of increasing Republican
seats and protecting the incumbent Republican against an increasingly powerful
45. Sanchez v. Colorado, 97 F.3d 1303, 1328 (10th Cir. 1996).
46. Id. (emphasis added).
47. Diaz v. Silver, 978 F. Supp. 96, 129 n.22 (E.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d, 522 U.S. 801 (1997).
48. Chen v. City of Houston, 206 F.3d 502, 515–16 (5th Cir. 2000).
49. Minnis, supra note 15; Karin Mac Donald & Bruce E. Cain, Community of Interest Methodology
and Public Testimony, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 4–6) (on file with U.C.
Irvine Law Review).
50. LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 418–62 (2006).
51. Id. at 423.
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Latino population that threatened to oust him.52 With regard to District 23 (in
west Texas), the Court applied the Gingles test and found that all three Gingles
requirements were satisfied—prong one being satisfied by establishing that
Latinos could have had an opportunity district if its lines were not altered, making
the fact that the group did not win an election in 2002 not determinative and
recognizing the growing Latino power since—such that the changes to District 23
undermined the progress of Latino voters, who were becoming increasingly
politically active and cohesive.53
This constituted voting dilution. Texas’s new District 25 (in south Texas)
included a new Latino majority-minority by joining Houston to a north-south strip
from Austin to the Rio Grande Valley.54 While the new District 25 meant to offset
the loss of Latino political power in the Latino opportunity district (District 23),
the Supreme Court held it did not successfully offset the loss to Latino
communities because the communities at the opposite ends of District 25 have
divergent “needs and interests” owing to “differences in socio-economic status,
education, employment, health, and other characteristics.”55 Consequently, the
Court concluded that the proposed redistricting plan violated the VRA’s voting
dilution prohibition. Under section 2, Texas diluted minority votes “if, based on
the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to
nomination or election . . . are not [as] equally open to . . . members of [a racial
group as they are to] other members of the electorate.”56 The legislative history of
section 2 identifies factors that courts can use in interpreting its “totality of
circumstances” standard. These factors include the state’s history of voting-related
discrimination, the extent to which voting is racially polarized, and the extent to
which the state has used voting practices or procedures that tend to enhance the

52. Id. at 424–25.
53. Id. at 425–42. More of the relevant factual background in LULAC:
Texas has a long, well-documented history of discrimination that has touched upon the
rights of African-Americans and Hispanics to register, to vote, or to participate otherwise
in the electoral process. . . . The history of official discrimination in the Texas election
process—stretching back to Reconstruction—led to the inclusion of the State as a covered
jurisdiction under [s]ection 5 in the 1975 amendments to the Voting Rights Act.
Id. at 439–40 (quoting Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304, 1317 (S.D. Tex. 1994)). Against this
background, the Latinos’ diminishing electoral support for [incumbent Governor] Bonilla indicates
their belief that he was “unresponsive to the particularized needs of the members of the minority
group.” Id. at 423. In essence, the State took away the Latinos’ opportunity because Latinos were
about to exercise it. This bears the mark of intentional discrimination that could give rise to an equal
protection violation. Even if we accept the District Court’s finding that the State’s action was taken
primarily for political, not racial, reasons, the redrawing of the district lines was damaging to the
Latinos in District 23. The State not only made fruitless the Latinos’ mobilization efforts but also
acted against those Latinos who were becoming most politically active, dividing them with a district
line through the middle of Laredo. Id. at 440.
54. Id. at 423.
55. Id. at 502, 512.
56. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2006).
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opportunity for discrimination against the minority group.57 Another relevant
consideration is whether the number of districts in which the minority group
forms an effective majority is roughly proportional to its share of the population
in the relevant area.58 The LULAC Court acknowledged that section 2 does not
expressly forbid the creation of a non-compact majority-minority district such as
District 25 if there is evidence of “communities of common interest” that ought to
be grouped into a single district.59 But it declared that the 300-mile gap between
the two Latino communities plus a similarly large gap between the needs and
interests of the two groups in District 25 made them different “communities of
interest.”60
The outcome in LULAC has revived recognition of communities of interest
analysis in section 2 minority voting dilution cases, even if it has not clarified the
reasoning used to identify them or the means by which it could be implemented
within the existing legal framework. In her introductory essay to an Ohio Law
School symposium organized in the aftermath of LULAC, Professor Heather
Gerken writes that legal scholars generally recognize the importance of CCI for
racial analysis under section 2 but they significantly differ in their readings of the
LULAC decision: all scholars agree that the decision established a “floor and

57. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28–29 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 206–07.
58. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1010 n.9 (1994).
59. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 430–31. Judicial recognition of community of interest dates back at
least as far as Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 999 (1996). Three years later, the Supreme Court in Hunt v.
Cromartie upheld a majority-minority district with a concentration of black voters as long as the intent
behind its creation was political rather than racial. Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 551–54 (1999).
“Thus, the Court inadvertently gave the nod to the concept of creating a district based on a
community of interest rather than its racial makeup, giving proponents an opportunity to draw
majority-minority districts in which minorities could predominate.” Walter C. Farrell, Jr. & James H.
Johnson, Jr., Minority Political Participation in the New Millennium: The New Demographics and the Voting
Rights Act, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1215, 1234 (2001). While the LULAC Court does not cite it directly, the
same concept was recognized in the context of an Asian American redistricting challenge by the
district court in Diaz v. Silver, 978 F. Supp. 96, 129 n.22 (E.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d, 522 U.S. 801 (1997).
Before Bush v. Vera, the Supreme Court in Miller v. Johnson discusses CCI with reservation:
[T]he State’s districting legislation [cannot] be rescued by mere recitation of purported
communities of interest. The evidence was compelling “that there are no tangible
‘communities of interest’ spanning the hundreds of miles of the Eleventh District.” A
comprehensive report demonstrated the fractured political, social, and economic interests
within the Eleventh District’s black population. It is apparent that it was not alleged shared
interests but rather the object of maximizing the district’s black population and obtaining
Justice Department approval that in fact explained the General Assembly’s actions. A State
is free to recognize communities that have a particular racial makeup, provided its action is
directed toward some common thread of relevant interests. “[W]hen members of a racial group
live together in one community, a reapportionment plan that concentrates members of the group in one
district and excludes them from others may reflect wholly legitimate purposes.” But where the State
assumes from a group of voters’ race that they “think alike, share the same political
interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls,” it engages in racial stereotyping
at odds with equal protection mandates.
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 919–20 (1995) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (citations
omitted) (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 646–47 (1993)).
60. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 432.
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ceiling for section 2 claims, though they differ as to how high the ceiling and how
low the floor.”61 Moreover, section 2 cases involving communities of interest after
2007 often arise in the context of two or more minority groups living in close
proximity and desiring to form a majority-minority district that surpasses the
Gingles requirements, further complicating the challenges of applying CCI doctrine
to complex fact patterns in an increasingly diverse modern society.62
This Article is meant to join in the chorus of voices exploring the
implications of CCI for racial equality in voting. It builds, in some respects, on
Professor Daniel Ortiz’s influential analysis of the racial implications of the
LULAC opinion in Cultural Compactness.63 Ortiz notes Justice Kennedy’s
discomfort in LULAC with Texas’s District 25, which combines poor rural
Hispanics along the Rio Grande and wealthier urbanites from Austin with
“differences in socio-economic status (SES), education, employment, health, and
other characteristics.”64 As a result of his discomfort, Ortiz coins the term
“cultural compactness” to describe Kennedy’s reconfiguration of the Gingles
“compactness” requirement to focus on culture, rather than geography or race per
se.65 Ortiz asks what effect this logic will have in minority vote dilution cases.66 If
the Court were to require that plaintiffs establish geographical, political, and
cultural compactness, section 2 claims would be much more difficult. But the
Court makes clear that this rigid form of compactness is not the literal
requirement. “We emphasize,” it states, that “it is the enormous geographical
distance separating Austin and the Mexican-border communities, coupled with the
disparate needs and interests of these populations—not either factor alone—that
renders District 25 non-compact for section 2 purposes.”67 In this view, either
geographical or cultural compactness alone is sufficient to satisfy this first
threshold requirement. Ortiz concludes, “This way of reinterpreting compactness,
if the Court is serious about it, would open up rather than close down [s]ection
2.”68 Similarly, Professor Lisa Kelly argues that “the perpetuation of historical
racial segregation and other forces emanating from the racial history of the United
States mean that race and place have been and continue to be inextricably
61. Gerken, supra note 5.
62. An illustrative list of cases raising coalition districting claims appears in note 254.
63. Daniel R. Ortiz, Cultural Compactness, 105 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 48, 50 (2006).
64. Id. at 49–50. From Justice Kennedy’s decision in LULAC:
Legitimate yet differing communities of interest should not be disregarded in the interest
of race. The practical consequence of drawing a district to cover two distant, disparate
communities is that one or both groups will be unable to achieve their political goals.
Compactness is, therefore, about more than “style points,” it is critical to advancing the
ultimate purposes of § 2, ensuring minority groups equal “opportunity . . . to participate in
the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.”
LULAC, 548 U.S. at 434 (citation omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2006)).
65. Ortiz, supra note 63.
66. Id.
67. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting LULAC, 548 U.S. at 402).
68. Id.
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intertwined.”69 Resisting the narrowing approach of some scholars,70 she argues
that the importance of race also transcends place, creating a community that has
little to do with geography and everything to do with the larger political and
cultural community of color. This larger community generally recognizes the
reality of racism, the pleasure of a common culture, and the need to act together
to effectuate common interests and to remedy common problems that repeat
themselves across geographical divides.”71
Beyond its implications for the Gingles compactness requirement, this Article
claims that the consequences of redefining cultural compactness extend to a
broader inquiry about the relevance of racial difference within minority groups to
section 2 analysis. Ortiz begins this task by broadening his initial inquiry beyond
the compactness prong of Gingles:
Although the Shaw cases worry about the differences between groups while
LULAC worries about the differences within groups, they share an
animating concern—what some have called “race essentialism.” They just
worry about it, so to speak, from different directions. Shaw says we
should not act as if people of different racial groups are very different
from each other—in this context, that Latinos and Anglos think and act
differently. LULAC, on the other hand, says that we should not assume
that people in the same racial group are all really the same—here, that all
Latinos have the same interests. Even if racial identity cashes out
politically—that is, Latinos of different stripes vote similarly—we must
still prove that they are culturally homogeneous.72
In essence, Ortiz thinks that if we take the Court’s anti-essentialism seriously,
much of existing equal protection doctrine might change for the worse. Such ingroup diversity is real, of course, but “legally recognizing it may be unfortunate to
members of the group itself . . . [the] danger is that increased sensitivity to
diversity within racial and gender groups might lead courts to question the salience
of traditional racial and gender categories.”73 Courts might lose their stomach for
the whole enterprise of racial analysis, if forced to engage in fine-tuned thinking
about difference.74 The undesirable result: anti-essentialism becomes a tool for
those least sensitive to true diversity, rather than part of the effort to empower
“new” racial minorities. However, this dismantling of race is not the only path
69. Lisa A. Kelly, Race and Place: Geographic and Transcendent Community in the Post-Shaw Era, 49
VAND. L. REV. 227, 234–35 (1996).
70. See Richard H. Pildes, The Decline of Legally Mandated Minority Representation, 68 OHIO ST. L.J.
1139, 1140 (2007).
71. Kelly, supra note 69, at 235.
72. Ortiz, supra note 63.
73. Id.
74. As Chief Justice Roberts stated in his dissenting opinion in LULAC v. Perry, “I do not
believe it is our role to make judgments about which mixes of minority voters should count for
purposes of forming a majority in an electoral district. . . . It is a sordid business, this divvying us up
by race.” LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 511 (2006) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
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available to the Court. Instead of throwing “race” out altogether, courts could
replace “race” with something meaningful and workable. Scholars could help by
providing a more nuanced exploration of culture, for example, that advances
understanding of modern diversity and identifies more fine-grained dimensions of
group identity (which may still correlate with race).
Existing scholarly attempts to further CCI analysis have been more
conceptual than concrete and they differ widely. As previously explained, Gerken
quips that scholars’ “interpretations of LULAC are so different that at times one
wonders whether they were reading the same opinion.”75 Professor Pam Karlan,
like Ortiz in Cultural Compactness, presents an optimistic reading of LULAC. She
indicates that LULAC revives the possibility that racial classifications used to
empower Latino voters can serve as a compelling interest—that is, she sees the
decision revitalizing a theory of representation rights under section 2.76 She sees
LULAC as an effort to take seriously districts drawn to empower racial minorities
by making sure they actually work in practice, rather than an attempt to cabin
race-conscious districting. While Professor Guy-Uriel Charles claims that
representation—not race per se—is the majority’s primary concern in LULAC, he
says that if the decision were about race, it was defending a nuanced concept of
anti-essentialism that focuses on the authenticity of racial representation: “Justice
Kennedy is not deciding between race consciousness and race-blindness; rather,
the choice is between token racial representation and authentic racial
representation.”77 Professor Rick Pildes offers the most pessimistic reading of
LULAC as a race case. He reads Kennedy’s majority opinion as a continuation of
Shaw’s message that the Court is “increasingly troubled by—indeed, more and
more resistant to—the very concept of minority vote dilution.”78 Consequently,
Pildes interprets cultural compactness as a constraint rather than an addendum to
the Gingles requirement of geographical compactness: “LULAC now adds [to
Shaw] the constraint that such districts must be, not only geographically compact,
but ideologically coherent—and most importantly, coherent in a deeper or
broader sense than that minority voters share a preference for minority candidates
pitted against majority ones.”79
We sidestep some of these conceptual disagreements in order to take
seriously the task of generating a meaningful, workable notion of cultural
compactness that serves to demonstrate political cohesion where race itself
cannot. We do much of this in the context of Asian American voters. Because
much of the CCI dialogue occurred in the immediate aftermath of LULAC, the

75. Gerken, supra note 5, at 1215.
76. Pamela S. Karlan, New Beginnings and Dead Ends in the Law of Democracy, 68 OHIO ST. L.J.
743, 760–61 (2007).
77. Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Race, Redistricting, and Representation, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1185, 1193 (2007).
78. Pildes, supra note 70; cf. Kelly, supra note 69; Charles, supra note 77.
79. Pildes, supra note 70, at 1145.
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implications for Latino voters are considered far more in number than for Asian
American voters. Even so, the CCI issues are just as important for Asian
Americans. At least eight cases raising section 2 challenges directly concern Asian
American voters, and many of them raise issues of cultural commonality.80 And
indeed, in the context of Asian Americans—a racial designation comprised of
numerous subethnic groups such as Korean American, Chinese American,
Filipino American, Vietnamese American, and Indian Americans—government
recognition of in-group cultural heterogeneity and cohesion may be a key
component of increasing democratic inclusion for the group as a whole. The panethnic classification is widely used in government. Congress, upon passing the
VRA, used the designation when describing the historical justification for
including Asian Americans under the legislation: “Discrimination against Asian
Americans is a well known and sordid part of our history.”81 The executive branch
similarly used the broad designation when documenting the continuing existence
of voting discrimination against Asian Americans: “[R]edistricting plans have
diluted Asian American voting strength by fragmenting communities into multiple
districts.”82 State and local governments have also recognized redistricting
practices that disadvantage Asian American voters in the 2011 redistricting cycle,

80. Ellen Katz’s master list codes seven cases as including Asian American voters: Growe v.
Emison, 507 U.S. 25 (1993), Debaca v. County of San Diego, No. 92-55661, 1993 WL 379838 (9th
Cir. Sept. 27, 1993), Brewer v. Ham, 876 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1989), Latino Political Action Comm. v.
City of Boston, 784 F.2d 409 (1st Cir. 1986), Common Cause v. Jones, No. 01-03470 SVW(RZX),
2002 WL 1766436 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2002), Balderas v. State, No. 6:01CV158, 2001 WL 34104833
(E.D. Tex. Nov. 28, 2001), and West v. Clinton, 786 F. Supp. 803 (W.D. Ark. 1992). See Katz, supra
note 43. Texas v. United States, No. 11-1303 (TBG-RMC-BAH), 2012 WL 3671924 (D.D.C. Aug. 28,
2012) also involves Asian American voters and arises after the period documented by Katz.
81. S. REP. NO. 94-295 at 28–30, 28 n.21 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 774, 794–96.
While Congress does not elaborate on that history in great detail, historians and race scholars have
shown that there is indeed a verifiable history of legal exclusion from citizenship and voting. See, e.g.,
ERIKA LEE, AT AMERICA’S GATES: CHINESE IMMIGRATION DURING THE EXCLUSION ERA (2003);
IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1996) (analyzing the
Supreme Court’s categorization of Asian immigrants as white in light of racial prerequisites to
citizenship that included only black-white categories); MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS:
ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA (2004); LUCY E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH
AS TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE SHAPING OF MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW (1995).
Some of these difficulties specifically involve redistricting practices that disadvantage Asian American
voters. See, e.g., Minnis, supra note 15, at 25 (describing difficulties in Chicago’s Chinatown). Language
barriers have also functioned to disenfranchise otherwise eligible Asian American voters. See, e.g.,
ANGELO N. ANCHETA, RACE, RIGHTS, AND THE ASIAN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE (2d ed. 2006).
This history is less often mentioned in mainstream histories of the Voting Rights Act than the story
of Selma, but it is nevertheless relevant to understanding democratic exclusion.
82. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, CIVIL RIGHTS ISSUES FACING ASIAN AMERICANS IN
THE 1990S 159–61 (1992).
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often in the context of coalition districts or assertions of communities of common
interest.83
Having presented the background of minority vote dilution and the concept
of cultural compactness as a supplement to section 2 racial analysis, Part II
presents more information about modern racial demographics and their
implications for political cohesion amidst culturally defined groups such as Asian
American voters.
II. DEMOCRATIC INCLUSION AND DEMOGRAPHIC DIVERSITY
As Part I shows, the VRA was intended primarily to address a specific group
(African Americans), a specific dyadic relation (blacks and whites), and a specific
set of historical and ongoing practices that excluded one group to the advantage
of another.84 The black-white paradigm that results from the VRA’s origins is the
default relation in VRA scholarship. Times have changed. By virtue of historical
happenstance, passage of the VRA coincided with changes to immigration policy
that would dramatically change the profile of racial minorities. Part II expands on
the legislative history of the VRA by briefly recounting the increasing
demographic diversity since passage of the 1965 VRA. It then considers the
implications of this elaborated history for understanding modern challenges of
democratic inclusion, particularly those of Asian American voters. In light of these
changing circumstances, Part II demonstrates the growing consensus that
yardsticks for evaluating whether voting rights are secured or violated are
somewhat stuck in time and nonresponsive to social, political, and legal changes.
A. Advancing Understanding of Modern Diversity
Prior to the mid-1960s, the American electorate was predominantly black
and white, with the primary challenge being the incorporation of black voters.85
The number of Asian American voters was comparatively small, and those present
were largely native born, due to decades of immigration restrictions preventing the
entrance of Asians into the United States. Since the Immigration and Nationality
Act was reformed in 1965,86 America’s racial landscape has been radically
transformed both in numbers and in the nature of intergroup relations.87 The
83. Recent examples of Asian American voters presenting evidence of CCI under state law
and in local elections arise in New York, California, and Michigan. See Minnis, supra note 15, at 37–42;
Mac Donald & Cain, supra note 49.
84. The VRA is nearly unassailable as a successful policy vis-à-vis the goal of bringing African
Americans into politics. See, e.g., CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING, supra note 11; THE
FUTURE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT (David L. Epstein et al. eds., 2006).
85. See supra Part I.
86. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (Hart-Cellar Act), Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat.
911.
87. On post-1965 demographic changes see, for example, FRANK D. BEAN & GILLIAN
STEVENS, AMERICA’S NEWCOMERS AND THE DYNAMICS OF DIVERSITY 2, 4–5 (2003), and
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changed policies resulted in a shift from a nation in which immigration was
carefully controlled by national quotas and roughly 90% of immigrants came from
Europe to a nation in which immigration rates are booming and about 85% came
from Latin America and Asia.88 Today, Latinos are the largest nonwhite minority
group in America.89
Asian Americans remain somewhat less in the limelight, but their population
change too is impressive. As a group, Asian Americans have grown in size from
1% of the total U.S. population in the 1970 census90 to about 6% in the most
recent 2010 census.91 Asian Americans have been the fastest growing racial group
in the last two decennial censuses.92 Since 2010, Asians have surpassed Latinos as
the single largest group contributing to America’s continuing immigrant
population.93 Asian Americans are projected to grow to 9% of the U.S. population
before midcentury.94
A further dimension of modern diversity is the rising numbers and emerging
recognition of Americans of multiple racial and ethnic backgrounds. Although
intermarriage rates remain lower than one would expect based on random
probability, exogamy is clearly increasing in the United States. As recently as the
1980 Census, less than 7% of all new marriages involved spouses of different
races/ethnicities;95 by the most recent 2010 Census, that rate had more than
doubled to 15%.96 Rates of exogamy, moreover, are higher for Asian Americans
(28% of Asian newlyweds marry someone of a different race, compared to 26% of
Latinos, 17% of African Americans, and only 9% of whites).97
In recognition of this trend and the problems entailed in forcing Americans
of mixed backgrounds to choose between lineages and family histories, the 2000
census introduced a “mark one or more” mode of multiracial identification.98
While the proportion of Americans who opt for multiple identification remains

JENNIFER LEE & FRANK D. BEAN, THE DIVERSITY PARADOX: IMMIGRATION AND THE COLOR
LINE IN TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY AMERICA 121–37 (2010).
88. Id. at 12.
89. Id. at 56.
90. Id. at 12.
91. The Rise of Asian Americans, PEW RESEARCH CENTER 2 (2012), http://www.pewsocial
trends.org/files/2013/01/SDT_Rise_of_Asian_Americans.pdf.
92. Id. at 1.
93. Id.
94. LEE & BEAN, supra note 87, at 12. On Asian American population trends, an excellent
overview can be found at The Rise of Asian Americans, supra note 91.
95. Wendy Wang, The Rise of Intermarriage, PEW RESEARCH CENTER 5 (2012), http://www
.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2012/02/SDT-Intermarriage-II.pdf.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 8; see also LEE & BEAN, supra note 87, at 87; RACHEL F. MORAN, INTERRACIAL
INTIMACY: THE REGULATION OF RACE AND ROMANCE (2001).
98. See LEE & BEAN, supra note 87; THE NEW RACE QUESTION: HOW THE CENSUS COUNTS
MULTIRACIAL INDIVIDUALS (Joel Perlmann & Mary C. Waters eds., 2002).

UCILR V3I2 Assembled v8.7 (Do Not Delete)

378

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

1/22/2014 4:12 PM

[Vol. 3:359

somewhat low (2.4% in 2000 and 2.9% in 2010),99 the multiracial population is
increasing, especially in select demographic quarters. Among youths, there has
been a 50% increase in the multiracial population since the 2000 census.100
Multiracial identification is also especially high among Asian Americans, with 15%
of the Asian American “alone or in combination” population in the 2010 census
also identifying with another racial or ethnic group.101 In this contemporary scene,
another challenge to the full realization of voting rights is the incorporating
recently arrived and naturalized voters.
While the emergence of CCI jurisprudence detailed in Part I and the post2000 census accounting for multiracialism detailed in Part II are both promising
developments, the VRA remains hamstrung by the fact that the original legislation
was not written with the scale or tenor of modern diversity in mind. Passage of
the Hart-Cellar Act in 1965,102 which eliminated immigration restrictions on the
basis of national origin, resulted in an unprecedented and unanticipated increase in
diversity. The initial increase in Asian immigration was compounded by family
reunification policies that increased the number of immigrants admitted
exponentially.103 That the resulting diversity was unprecedented is well
documented, but that it was unanticipated is less so.104 However, the emerging
consensus is that proponents of immigration reform in 1965 intended the HartCellar provision to be primarily a symbolic gesture.105 Indeed, as President Lyndon
B. Johnson announced during the legislative debates leading up to enactment
“This is not a revolutionary bill. It will not reshape the structure of our daily
lives.”106 Commenting specifically on Asians and Pacific Islanders in testimony
99. Susan Saulny, Census Data Presents Rise in Multiracial Population of Youths, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
25, 2011, at A3.
100. Id.
101. KAREN R. HUMES ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, OVERVIEW OF RACE AND HISPANIC
ORIGIN: 2010, at 8 (2011), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-02.pdf.
102. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (Hart-Cellar Act), Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat.
911.
103. The chain migration mechanism that led to a rapid increase of the Asian population
under family reunification provisions is explained in DAVID M. REIMERS, STILL THE GOLDEN
DOOR: THE THIRD WORLD COMES TO AMERICA 92–99 (2d ed. 1992).
104. HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, COLLISION COURSE: THE STRANGE CONVERGENCE OF
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND IMMIGRATION POLICY IN AMERICA 95–103 (2002) (explaining how
immigration policies and race-based affirmative action policies came into conflict with each other and
resulted in policy contradictions that were widely resented by civil rights advocates); cf. Gabriel J.
Chin, The Civil Rights Revolution Comes to Immigration Law: A New Look at the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1965, 75 N.C. L. REV. 273, 303–17 (1996) (challenging the conventional view that Congress
neither anticipated, nor intended, to diversify America by lifting racial quotas and instead concluding
that Congress deliberately rejected the idea of a white America and welcomed the diversification that
it knew would result from eliminating racial discrimination).
105. Jennifer Hochschild & Traci Burch, Contingent Public Policies and Racial Hierarchy: Lessons
from Immigration and Census Policies, in POLITICAL CONTINGENCY: STUDYING THE UNEXPECTED, THE
ACCIDENTAL, AND THE UNFORESEEN 138, 138–64 (Ian Shapiro & Sonu Bedi eds., 2007).
106. Remarks at the Signing of the Immigration Bill, Liberty Island, New York, 2 PUB.
PAPERS 1037, 1038 (Oct. 3, 1965).
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before Congress in 1964, Attorney General Robert Kennedy remarked, “I would
say for the Asia-Pacific triangle . . . 5,000 immigrants would come in the first year,
but we do not expect that there would be any great influx after that.”107 Both men,
it turned out, were incorrect. Given that Asians were not seen as a primary
beneficiary of the group, they were unlikely to have been at the forefront of the
minds of legislators during passage of the VRA the same year.
Exacerbating the historical omission of Asian Americans and other racial
minorities who predominantly migrated after 1965 in its remedial voting inequality
legislation,108 the government has struggled to keep pace with demographic
change. Census efforts have often undercounted Asian Americans as a result of
language barriers and difficulties locating and accounting for nontraditional family
structures. Nevertheless, bureaucratic efforts to make this increasingly diverse
society legible through standardization and commensuration eventually resulted in
Asian Americans having an established place in America’s “ethnoracial
pentagon.”109 The basis of including Asian Americans as an official racial minority
group in civil rights legislation is premised on shared experiences of racial
discrimination and a proximate place of national origin.
B. Adapting the Black-White Paradigm to Modern Diversity
The black-white dyadic framework underlying the VRA is certainly not
without merit. To the contrary, it is rooted in a desire to remedy an egregious
history of voting discrimination. With this goal in mind, it has been remarkably
successful in improving democratic participation for African Americans.110 As a
framework, it has also been immensely useful in generating research that sheds
empirical light on the ways that racial markers can differentially define the
everyday realities and opportunities of African Americans and whites across a
range of indicia from income and wealth disparities, intergenerational upward
mobility, and mass imprisonment to minority political participation and electoral
competition.111

107. Hearing on H.R. 7700 Before the Subcomm. No. 1 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong.
418 (1964) (statement of Robert F. Kennedy, Att’y Gen. of the United States).
108. See supra Part I.
109. See DAVID A. HOLLINGER, POSTETHNIC AMERICA: BEYOND MULTICULTURALISM 19–
20 (1995) (discussing Revised Directive 15 classification).
110. More data on this to come, infra Part III. This is not to say that political participation
among African Americans is paralleled by equivalent gains in other realms of life, nor to deny that
Asian Americans have made comparatively greater strides in non-political fora.
111. On black-white differences in earnings and wealth, see, for example, MELVIN L. OLIVER
& THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH 204 (2d ed. 2006). On intergenerational
upward mobility and residential context, see Patrick Sharkey, The Intergenerational Transmission of Context,
113 AM. J. SOC. 931 (2008). On differential rates of mass incarceration, see BRUCE WESTERN,
PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 17, 27 (2006). On minority political participation and
electoral competition, see, for example, Lawrence Bobo & Franklin Gilliam, Race, Sociopolitical
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In comparison, this dyadic framework and the attendant theories on race
that derive from it has worked in fits and starts for “other” racial minority groups,
such as Latinos and Asian Americans.112 Moreover, scholars like Professor Juan
Perea allege that the dominance of a “black/white binary paradigm” of race
scholarship threatens to render the specificity of discrimination against other
minority groups opaque, if not altogether occluded.113 To be clear, we are not
pushing an observation about the limitations of a binary view of race to a
conclusion about the irrelevance of black-white discrimination or about whether
Latinos and Asian Americans will ultimately come to ally with either blacks or
whites within a fixed black-white binary view of race.114 Rather, our main aim here
is simply to identify the ways—conceptually and empirically—that our
understanding of the challenges facing nonblack minority voters is limited by such
a binary view.
Conceptually, the black-white paradigm in voting rights fails to consider that
Asian Americans occupy a different place in racial politics than African
Americans.115 That is, they are not just another numerical minority as compared to

Participation, and Black Empowerment, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 377, 381–83 (1990), and PAUL FRYMER,
UNEASY ALLIANCES: RACE AND PARTY COMPETITION IN AMERICA 8–11 (1999).
112. The term “other minorities” is coined by Bruce Cain and Ken Miller among others to
explain what happens when black-white paradigms are applied to Latinos and Asian Americans.
Loosely, it refers to non-black minorities. See Bruce E. Cain & Kenneth P. Miller, Voting Rights
Mismatch: The Challenge of Applying the Voting Rights Act to “Other Minorities,” in VOTING RIGHTS AND
REDISTRICTING IN THE UNITED STATES 141, 145–46, 161 (Mark E. Rush ed. 1998).
113. Juan F. Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The “Normal Science” of American
Racial Thought, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1213, 1215 (1997); see also Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian American
Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 1 ASIAN L.J. 1, 27 (1994);
Deborah Ramirez, Multicultural Empowerment: It’s Not Just Black and White Anymore, 47 STAN. L. REV.
957, 959 (1995); Janine Young Kim, Are Asians Black?: The Asian-American Civil Rights Agenda and the
Contemporary Significance of the Black/White Paradigm, 108 YALE L.J. 2385, 2386 (1999).
114. Notably, scholars like Herbert Gans and Frank Bean have noted that one possible
outcome of the racial and ethnic diversity that is currently being negotiated in America is a form of
“black exceptionalism,” in which the conditions of African Americans are distinct (and distinctly
dispossessed) compared not only to whites, but also to Asian Americans and Latinos. See Frank D.
Bean et al., The New U.S. Immigrants: How Do They Affect Our Understanding of the African American
Experience?, 621 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 202, 215 (2009); Herbert J. Gans, The Possibility
of a New Racial Hierarchy in the Twenty-First-Century United States, in THE CULTURAL TERRITORIES OF
RACE: BLACK AND WHITE BOUNDARIES 371, 372–86 (Michele Lamont ed. 1999).
115. For more on Asian American politics, see generally Wendy K. Tam Cho & Albert H.
Yoon, Pan-Ethnicity Revisited: Asian Indians, Asian American Politics, and the Voting Rights Act, 10 UCLA
ASIAN PACIFIC AM. L.J. 10 (2005) (discussing the pan-ethnicity of Asian Americans and whether the
Voting Rights Act provides any aid toward Asian American political empowerment), Claire Jean Kim
& Taeku Lee, Interracial Politics: Asian Americans and Other Communities of Color, 34 PS: POL. SCI. & POL.
105 (2001) (discussing the interactions between Asian Americans and other communities of color),
Claire Jean Kim, The Racial Triangulation of Asian Americans, 27 POL. & SOC’Y 105 (1999) (discussing
the racial triangulation of Asian Americans in relation to blacks and whites), Pei-te Lien, Race, Nativity,
and the Political Participation of Asian and Other Americans, in THE POLITICS OF INCLUSION AND
EXCLUSION: IDENTITY POLITICS IN TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY AMERICA 25 (David F. Ericson ed.,
2011) (discussing voting participation of foreign-born citizens and the transformation of the
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majority voters. Their attributes and behaviors as voters differ, such that they are
systematically disadvantaged by majoritarian politics. Professors Bruce Cain and
Ken Miller set forth basic assumptions underlying the VRA’s models of racial
politics for black, Latino, and Asian voters in Table 1.116 The first labeled column
describes VRA assumptions that sync with African American voters’ historical
experience. The subsequent columns capture in general terms how well those
assumptions travel as characterizations about Latino and Asian American voters
respectively. As Cain and Miller explain, “The first, and in many ways most
central, premise is that a protected group has a large (that is, a majority or super
majority) core population that is eligible to vote but has been prevented from
doing so by institutional barriers.”117
Table 1: Cain and Miller’s Comparison of Group Heterogeneity118
Black

Latino

Asian

Size

Relatively stable
population share;
little CVAP-population
gap.

Rapidly growing
population share; large
CVAP- population gap.

Rapidly growing
population share; large
CVAP-population gap
(except Japanese).

Dispersion

High segregation and
concentration except in
rural South.

Variable concentration
levels.

Generally low
concentration.

Coherence

High coherence
and few nationality
differences.

Weak pan-ethnic
coherence; moderately
high ethnic coherence
based on partisanship.

Weak pan-ethnic
coherence; moderate to
low ethnic coherence with
large partisan divisions.

Polarization

High levels in many areas.

Variable levels of white
bloc voting.

High levels of white
support.

CVAP = Citizen voting age population

American electorate), Paul Ong & Don T. Nakanishi, Becoming Citizens, Becoming Voters: The
Naturalization and Political Participation of Asian Pacific Immigrants, in THE STATE OF ASIAN PACIFIC
AMERICA: REFRAMING THE IMMIGRATION DEBATE 275 (Bill Ong Hing & Ronald Lee eds., 1996)
(discussing the naturalization and political participation rates of Asian Americans), and Carol J.
Uhlaner et al., Political Participation of Ethnic Minorities in the 1980s, 11 POL. BEHAV. 195 (1989)
(discussing the amount of political participation by members of ethnic minority groups and the
factors that affect the level of their activity).
116. Adapted from Cain & Miller, supra note 112. Each assumption is explained at 149–54,
and its inapplicability is explained at 155–61.
117. Id. at 148.
118. Id. at 149.
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The first and second rows of the table describe basic assumptions about
group size and dispersion. While sufficient size and dispersion are relatively easy
to prove for African American voters (notwithstanding below-average levels of
education/income and high residential mobility that depress voting rates), it is
trickier for Latino and Asian American communities who face higher-than-average
rates of non-citizenship and age ineligibility, which create large discrepancies
between their share of the population and their share of the citizen voting age
population (CVAP) and create the impression of an insufficiently large size for
Gingles.119 As Cain and Miller note, this CVAP gap for a longer-term group like
Japanese Americans is significantly smaller than it is for newer, heavily immigrantbased groups.120
While we do not take issue with Cain and Miller’s general characterization of
the population characteristics of African Americans, Latinos, and Asian Americans
with respect to size and dispersion, we do note that these characteristics for
Latinos and Asian Americans are changing and vary across the ethnic/national
origin subgroups that comprise these heavily immigrant and second-generation
based pan-ethnic populations. Focusing just on the spatial concentration of Asian
Americans, we note that concentration is high in ethnic enclaves like urban
Chinatowns, “Little Saigons,” “J-towns,” and the like. Moreover, the number of
cities in which Asian Americans either constitute or are rapidly approaching a
majority of the population is growing. According to the 2010 Census, six cities of
100,000 or more residents have at least 40% Asian Americans: Urban Honolulu
(68%), Daly City (58%), Fremont (55%), Sunnyvale (44%), and Irvine (43%).121
The VRA presumes that the protected group can demonstrate a persistent
pattern of electoral frustration as demonstrated by intragroup cohesion and
intergroup polarization. The third row of Table 1 summarizes Cain and Miller’s
assessment of how blacks, Latinos, and Asians fare on the VRA test’s expectation
of political cohesion—that protected groups act as a “single political entity
exhibiting common political goals and actions.”122 While this standard is relatively
easy to meet for African Americans who exhibit the highest levels of political
coherence of any racial group, Asian Americans’ pan-ethnic groupings, which
aggregate across multiple nationalities subsumed in U.S. census classifications of
Asian American voters, interfere with perceptions of common interest that are
typically measured by political coherence and polarization.123 Here we take
stronger issue with Cain and Miller’s assessment that levels of pan-ethnic
coherence among Asian Americans are weak and that there are large partisan
divisions between the different Asian ethnic sub-groups. Since Cain and Miller’s

119. Id. at 150.
120. Id. at 153.
121. Figures were obtained by the authors from the Census Bureau’s “FactFinder” tool at
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, www.census.gov (last visited Mar. 31, 2013).
122. Cain & Miller, supra note 112, at 152.
123. Id.
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analysis in 1998, Asian Americans have become discernibly more politically
cohesive, with high rates of partisan voting in the 2008 and 2012 elections and a
narrowing gap in the variance of this partisan voting between Asian ethnic subgroups. These recent shifts are referenced and discussed in fuller detail in ensuing
sections.
Row four of Table 1 reflects the assumption of racial polarization. This
requirement is well suited to African Americans who have a long and welldocumented history of disenfranchisement at the hands of white voters.124 For
Asian Americans, we would quibble with Cain and Miller’s assessment of “high
levels of white support.” There are, as we will also see in ensuing sections, some
empirical grounds for worry that white opposition to Asian American candidates
is prevalent. Perhaps more importantly, the number of cases of Asian American
candidates running for political office (in majority white districts) is probably too
small to make an accurate judgment of either white support or opposition. Asian
Americans quite simply have a relatively limited history of running for elected
office—a prerequisite for detecting patterns of electoral frustration.125 Changing
numbers, partisan affiliations, and multiracial urban settlement (as opposed to
southern biracial settlement) further complicate calculations of electoral
opportunities; it is not always clear when there are enough potential voters to
justify a new minority influence district according to the required showing of
electoral opportunity.126
The challenges that arise in moving from a binary black-white understanding
of racial polarization to a more multiplex, prismatic set of relations are not only
conceptual and empirical, but also methodological. Leaving aside the particularities
of Asian Americans within the Gingles frame, empirical legal scholars recognize the
mathematical and methodological problems of equalizing voting rights when
moving from biracial to multiracial jurisdictions.127 For the most part, two
methods for estimating racially polarized voting have been predominant—a simple
bivariate form of ecological regression (“Goodman’s regression”) and a “method
of bounds” based on an analysis of racially homogeneous precincts.128 These
124. Id. at 151.
125. Id. For more on immigration-related challenges to electoral participation, see generally
Paul M. Ong & Megan Emiko Scott, Asian American Civil and Political Engagement: Patterns, Challenges,
and Potentials, 18 ASIAN AM. POL’Y REV. 25 (2009).
126. Cain & Miller, supra note 112, at 153.
127. John O. Calmore suggests that the types of barriers differ regionally in the biracial south
and multiracial California. John O. Calmore, Race-Conscious Voting Rights and the New Demography in a
Multiracing America, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1253, 1256 (2001).
128. The two primary (to date) contrasting methods for drawing such ecological inferences
are presented in Otis Dudley Duncan & Beverly Davis, An Alternative to Ecological Correlation, 18 AM.
SOC. REV. 665, 665–66 (1953), and Leo A. Goodman, Ecological Regressions and the Behavior of Individuals,
18 AM. SOC. REV. 663, 663–64 (1953). The classic statement of the “ecological inference problem”—
namely, the issue of statistical “identification” that arises when trying to draw inferences about
individual-level motives and behavior from aggregate-level data—is found in W.S. Robinson, Ecological
Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals, 15 AM. SOC. REV. 351, 351–57 (1950). Excellent surveys of
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methods, however, have come under increasing scrutiny in the context of the
growing diversity of America’s electorate. While legal scholars have taken up this
observation about the growing diversity of the electorate, it has largely been in
terms of the possibility of a decline in racially correlated voting.129
As Professor James Greiner notes, modern diversity also raises specific
methodological challenges.130 The basic problem of inference involved in
assessing the presence or absence of racially polarized voting results from needing
to know about individual-level behavior and opinion but not being able to observe
it. In essence, the secret ballot renders the choices and motivations of white, black,
or “other race” voters for white, black, or “other race” candidates unknowable.
The typical best-available proxy for these individual-level data are aggregate
(usually precinct-level) data, or individual-level data from exit polls or pre- and
post-election surveys that rely on cooperation and accurate recall from survey
respondents.
Furthermore, existing methods for assessing polarized voting are optimally
useful when there are only two racial groups and two political parties involved.
With more than two potentially polarized groups (or, for that matter, more than
two potentially polarized political parties), the bivariate ecological regression and
the method of analyzing homogeneous precincts mentioned in Gingles are
“inherently fragile.”131 The statistical challenges in inferring individual-level
motives and behavior from aggregate-level data are compounded with multiple
racial groups for the simple reason that “more racial groups mean more moving
parts”—whether within a single precinct or across precincts.132 The nub of these
methodological implications of modern diversity is that the two statistical
techniques noted in Gingles are clearly outmoded.133

this problem, specific to the realm of voting rights, are in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING,
supra note 11; D. James Greiner, Ecological Inference in Voting Rights Act Disputes: Where Are We Now, and
Where Do We Want to Be?, 47 JURIMETRICS J. 115 (2007); J. Morgan Kousser, Ecological Inference from
Goodman to King, 34 HIST. METHODS 101 (2001).
129. See Charles S. Bullock III & Richard E. Dunn, The Demise of Racial Districting and the Future
of Black Representation, 48 EMORY L.J. 1209, 1228–35 (1999); Richard H. Pildes, Is Voting-Rights Law
Now at War with Itself?: Social Science and Voting Rights in the 2000s, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1517, 1529 (2002);
Melissa L. Saunders, Of Minority Representation, Multiple-Race Responses, and Melting Pots: Redistricting in the
New America, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1367, 1370–73 (2001); Note, The Future of Majority-Minority Districts in
Light of Declining Racially Polarized Voting, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2208, 2209–11 (2003).
130. See D. James Greiner, Re-Solidifying Racial Bloc Voting: Empirics and Legal Doctrine in the
Melting Pot, 86 IND. L.J. 447, 463–65 (2011).
131. Id. at 463.
132. Id. at 465.
133. Greiner, specifically, makes a strong and (we find) convincing case that the prevalent uses
of Goodman’s regression and a “method of bounds” analysis of homogeneous precincts ought to be
jettisoned. Id. at 464. Greiner further argues that a third and recently popular estimator, Gary King’s
proposed “solution” to the ecological inference problem, GARY KING, A SOLUTION TO THE
ECOLOGICAL INFERENCE PROBLEM: RECONSTRUCTING INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR FROM
AGGREGATE DATA (1997), ought to be used only as a last resort. Greiner, supra note 130, at 470.
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Better techniques are well overdue. Greiner and Kevin Quinn, for instance,
argue in some recent papers for using a more flexible class of statistical models
such as Dirichlet-Multinomial methods that can extend the “2 × 2” case (two
races, two parties) to “R × C” ecological models.134 They also advocate for the
attractive statistical properties that result from using a combination of surveybased (for example, exit polls) and ecological aggregate data (for example, precinct
results).135 For Asian Americans, however, the limitations of data are especially
acute and render these more advanced methods generally inapplicable.
On this point, a very brief excursion into the state of evidence on Asian
American voting behavior is in order. To start with the standard and typically
authoritative source of individual-level data on any population subgroup comes
from federal agencies such as the U.S. Census Bureau and other federal agencies
like the U.S. Bureau of Labor. Here, we note that the first constraint on available
data has been the issue of classification—how Asian Americans will be
categorized, which subgroups will be separately enumerated, whether and when
Asian Americans will be classified together with Pacific Islanders, and the like.136
The greater constraint lies in federal data collection on voter registration and voter
turnout in the Current Population Survey (CPS). The CPS, which is a regular and
primary source of federal data on labor force characteristics, collects data on voter
registration and turnout every November in which there is a congressional or
presidential election.137 These data are collected in only two interview languages:
English and Spanish.138 With Asian Americans, this is a limiting constraint, as
nearly two-thirds of are foreign-born and one in three are limited in their English
proficiency.139 Roughly half or more of certain groups like Vietnamese, Hmong,
Cambodians, Laotians, Taiwanese, Koreans, and Chinese, are classified by the

134. See D. James Greiner & Kevin M. Quinn, Exit Polling and Racial Bloc Voting: Combining
Individual-Level and R × C Ecological Data, 4 ANNALS APPLIED STAT. 1774, 1775–76 (2010) [hereinafter
Greiner & Quinn, Exit Polling]; D. James Greiner & Kevin M. Quinn, R × C Ecological Inference: Bounds,
Correlations, Flexibility and Transparency of Assumptions, 172 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y 67, 79 (2009)
[hereinafter Greiner & Quinn, R × C Ecological Inference]. For alternatives other than MultinomialDirichlet and King’s EI, see also Adam N. Glynn & Jon Wakefield, Ecological Inference in the Social
Sciences, 7 STAT. METHODOLOGY 307 (2010).
135. Greiner & Quinn, Exit Polling, supra note 134; Greiner & Quinn, R × C Ecological Inference,
supra note 134.
136. For more on pan-Asian classification, see generally Yen Le Espiritu & Michael Omi,
“Who Are You Calling Asian?”: Shifting Identity Claims, Racial Classification, and the Census, in 4 THE STATE
OF ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICA: TRANSFORMING RACE RELATIONS 43 (Paul M. Ong ed., 2000).
137. Voting and Registration, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/
socdemo/voting (last visited Mar. 31, 2013).
138. See Sunghee Lee et al., Linguistic Minorities in a Health Survey, 72 PUB. OPINION Q. 470, 472
(2008) (discussing use of only English and Spanish for the Current Population Survey Behavioral Risk
Factor Surveillance System).
139. DIANNE A. SCHMIDLEY, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PROFILE OF THE FOREIGN-BORN
POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES: 2000, at 24 (2001), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/
2002pubs/p23-206.pdf.
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census as having “limited English proficiency.”140 Moreover, prior research
demonstrates that the language in which interviews are conducted produces
significant and substantive differences in what people say on surveys.141 These
differences are quite persistent and pervasive; they have a basis in the experience
of being an immigrant and ethnic minority.142
These same limitations, moreover, are endemic to most exit poll data, the
other obvious source of individual-level data on racially polarized voting. The
main source of exit poll data—the National Election Pool143—surveys its Asian
American respondents only in English. There are, to be sure, various other
datasets that are more attentive to the nuances involved in surveying Asian
Americans. For instance, post-election exit polls from advocacy organizations like
the Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund conduct their interviews
in multiple Asian languages (and in English), but these data are often limited in
their content (they typically ask a small set of questions about voters’ candidate
choices), truncated in their sample (by definition, exit polls provide only the data
of those who turn out to vote), and biased in their representativeness (the
sampling for these exit polls typically skew to an emphasis on heavily Asian
precincts).144 There are other research-based studies that avoid some of these
pitfalls, but most of these incur yet others.145 The 2000 to 2001 Pilot National
Asian American Political Survey (PNAAPS),146 for instance, is limited by a

140. PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY COMM. ON ASIAN AMERICANS AND PACIFIC ISLANDERS,
ASIAN AMERICANS AND PACIFIC ISLANDERS: A PEOPLE LOOKING FORWARD 7 (2001) [hereinafter
PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY COMM.].
141. See Martin Johnson et al., Language Choice, Residential Stability, and Voting Among Latino
Americans, 84 SOC. SCI. Q. 412, 419 (2003) (describing how survey respondents were significantly less
likely to report voting in the 2000 presidential election when interviewed in Spanish); Lee et al., supra
note 138, at 472; Efrén O. Pérez, Lost in Translation? Item Validity in Bilingual Political Surveys, 71 J. POL.
1530, 1531 (2009); Susan Welch et al., Interviewing in a Mexican-American Community: An Investigation of
Some Potential Sources of Response Bias, 37 PUB. OPINION Q. 115, 116 (1973).
142. See sources cited supra note 141.
143. The National Election Pool is a consortium of six major media organizations—ABC,
Associated Press, CBS, CNN, FOX, and NBC—that replaced the previous Voter News Services,
which dissolved after questionable practices and predictions in the 2000 and 2002 elections. Frequently
Asked Questions About the NEP Exit Poll, EDISON RESEARCH, http://www.edisonresearch.com/electionresearch-services/exit-polling-faq-frequently-asked-questions-about-the-nep-exit-poll (last visited Mar.
31, 2013).
144. Asian Americans at the Ballot Box: The 2008 General Election in Los Angeles County, ASIAN PAC.
AM. LAW CENTER, http://apalc.org/sites/default/files/APALC_BallotBox_LA2008_FINAL.pdf (last
visited Mar. 31, 2013); Brian Lee et al., The Asian American Vote in the 2008 Presidential Election, ASIAN AM.
LEGAL DEF. AND EDUC. FUND, (2009), available at http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/modules/tinyd8/content/
document/Speech_2012.10.24/AALDEF-ExitPoll-2008.pdf. Other exit polls from the affiliate
organizations can be found at Voting Rights and Section 203, ASIAN AM. JUST. CENTER, http://www
.advancingequality.org/voting-rights (last visited Mar. 31, 2013).
145. A fuller discussion of the data limitations in Asian American voting behavior can be
found in JANELLE WONG ET AL., ASIAN AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: EMERGING
CONSTITUENTS AND THEIR POLITICAL IDENTITIES 13–15 (2011).
146. The figures reported throughout this Article relating to the 2000 to 2001 PNAAPS are
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regional emphasis—since only Asian Americans from five major metropolitan
areas (New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, the San Francisco Bay Area, and
Honolulu) were interviewed.
From a data perspective, some of the impetus behind our inquiry into the
possibility of section 2 claims by Asian Americans comes from the availability of
some exciting new data. Our evidence in this Article comes primarily from three
recent surveys: the 2004 to 2005 National Politics Study (NPS),147 the 2007 Los
Angeles County Social Survey (LACSS),148 and the 2008 National Asian American
Survey (NAAS).149 The NPS and the LACSS are surveys focused on better
understanding racial politics and race relations. Both surveys include
“oversamples” of African American, Asian American, and Latino respondents to
enable across-group comparisons.150 The NAAS is the first nationally
representative survey focused exclusively on the political patterns and perspectives
of Asians in the United States. The NAAS data are noteworthy for representing a
sufficiently large sample (5,159 completed interviews) to allow results to be
disaggregated down to the six largest ethnic/national-origin Asian groups in
America—Chinese, Filipinos, Indians, Japanese, Koreans, and Vietnamese.151 The

the result of the authors’ primary analysis of raw survey data. Raw data and the codebook are available
through the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR). See Pilot National
Asian American Political Survey (PNAAPS), 2000-2001 (ICPSR 3832), ICSPSR, http://www.icpsr.umich
.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/3832 (last visited Mar. 31, 2013) [hereinafter PNAAPS, 2000-2001].
More information and data sets are available at NATIONAL ASIAN AMERICAN SURVEY, http://www
.naasurvey.com (last visited Mar. 31, 2013); see also WONG ET AL., supra note 145, at 15–20.
147. The figures reported throughout this Article relating to the 2004 NPS are the result of
the authors’ primary analysis of raw survey data. Raw data and the codebook are available through the
ICPSR. See National Politics Study, 2004 (ICPSR 24483), ICPSR, http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/
icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/24483 (last visited Mar. 31, 2013). [hereinafter NPS, 2004].
148. The figures reported throughout this Article relating to the 2007 LACSS are the result of
the authors’ primary analysis of raw survey data. The raw data are not publicly available; co-principal
investigators for this study are Mark Sawyer (Lead Principal Investigator, UCLA), Taeku Lee (UC
Berkeley), James Sidanius (Harvard), and Janelle Wong (University of Maryland). The codebook is
available upon request from Taeku Lee. See Mark Sawyer et al., Los Angeles County Social Survey,
2007: Codebook (unpublished) (on file with authors).
149. The figures reported throughout this Article relating to the 2008 NAAS are the result of
the authors’ primary analysis of raw survey data. Raw data and the codebook are available through the
ICPSR. See National Asian American Survey, 2008 (ICPSR 31481), ICPSR, http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/
icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/31481 (last visited Mar. 31, 2013) [hereinafter NAAS, 2008].
150. LACSS, 2007, supra note 148; NPS, 2004, supra note 147. The survey dates for the 2004
to 2005 NPS are September 3, 2004 to February 25, 2005. NPS, 2004, supra note 147. A total of 3,339
telephone interviews were conducted, with a final sample of 756 African Americans, 919 nonHispanic Whites, 404 Caribbean Blacks, 757 Latinos, and 503 Asian Americans. Id. at 8. The survey
dates for the 2007 LACSS are May to July 2007. LACSS, 2007, supra note 148. A total of 1,102
telephone interviews were conducted, with a final sample of 276 Asian Americans, 275 African
Americans, 275 Latinos, 260 Whites, and 16 Native Americans. Id.
151. NAAS, 2008, supra note 149. The breakdown of the NAAS sample is 1,350 Chinese, 603
Filipinos, 1,150 Indians, 541 Japanese, 614 Koreans, 719 Vietnamese, and 182 respondents from
other groups. Id.
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NAAS is also noteworthy for conducting interviews in eight languages: English,
Cantonese, Mandarin, Vietnamese, Korean, Tagalog, Japanese, and Hindi).152
Yet even the best currently available data are limited in numerous respects—
the data are cross-sectional and allow only for a single snapshot in time, the
number of cases (large as it is) is still insufficient to drill down to the level of most
electoral jurisdictions, the questions are not tailored for a full analysis of barriers
to full political inclusion, the NAAS surveys only Asian Americans (making
comparisons on similar issues and items to African Americans, Latinos, whites,
and other groups somewhat treacherous), the NPS and LACSS surveys ask only
items of comparison across groups and are of limited use in “drilling down” to
better understand any single group, and so on. In this relatively data-poor context,
our approach here is to use the best data available, with appropriate rejoinders on
their limitations. In most cases, the best available data will come from these three
surveys.153
These conceptual and empirical limitations are revealed in accumulating
evidence that existing paradigms do not work well for Asian American voters.154
Political scientists studying democratic inclusion often focus on two measures
used to gauge the extent to which groups are empowered in electoral democracies:
participation in elections through voting and representation of electorates through
the holding of political offices.155 Asian Americans are underrepresented on both
measures. On the participatory end of the spectrum, voter participation begins
with prerequisites for a largely foreign-born population that are not always present
for African Americans: naturalization into citizenship, voter registration, and
voting itself. There is significant drop-off at each stage. Furthermore, Asian
Americans are disproportionately underrepresented, relative to their population

152. Id. Roughly sixty percent of the NAAS sample opted for a non-English interview. Id.
153. We are mindful of the fact that D. James Greiner, among others, also cautions against
relying solely on survey data to make a positive case about racially polarized voting. In Greiner’s
words,
The proper role of surveys in Voting Rights Act disputes is complex and, to my
knowledge, has received no scholarly attention to date. But whatever else may be true of
them, surveys and exit polls cannot retrospectively provide evidence regarding racial voting
patterns going back six or ten or more years, which appears to be what courts often require
to support a finding that voting is racially polarized.
Greiner, supra note 128, at 120.
154. See Calmore, supra note 127, at 1280; Leo F. Estrada, Making the Voting Rights Act Relevant
to the New Demographics of America: A Response to Farrell and Johnson, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1283, 1283 (2001);
Kevin R. Johnson, Latinas/os and the Political Process: The Need for Critical Inquiry, 81 OR. L. REV. 917,
937–39 (2002); Sylvia Lazos Vargas, Latino/a and APIA Vote Post-2000: What Does It Mean to Move
Beyond “Black and White” Politics?, 81 OR. L. REV. 783, 810 (2002).
155. See Lawrence Bobo & Franklin D. Gilliam, Jr., Race, Sociopolitical Participation, and Black
Empowerment, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 377, 387 (1990) (noting a link between political participation and
representation among African Americans); see also Michael Jones Correa, Bringing Outsiders In: Questions
of Immigrant Incorporation, in THE POLITICS OF DEMOCRATIC INCLUSION 75, 75–77 (Christina
Wolbrecht et al. eds., 2005) (discussing the salience of political participation and representation
among immigrants).
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numbers, among active voters and among registered voters. The 2008 CPS Voting
and Registration Supplements show that out of the U.S. adult population of Asian
Americans, roughly two out of three are naturalized (67%), slightly more than one
out of three are registered to vote (37%), and less than one in three report having
voted (32%).156 These two initial stages of immigrant incorporation contribute to
the low rates of Asian American voting; once Asian Americans are registered to
vote, they vote at a rate (86%) not too different from that of all registered
American voters (90%).157
On the other measure of inclusion, Asian Americans are disproportionately
underrepresented, relative to their population numbers, among elected officials at
federal, state, and local levels. In fact, no other racial minority group is as
underrepresented, with the exception of Native Americans. In 2006, less than one
percent (0.9%) of all members of Congress were Asian Americans and barely one
percent (1.1%) in state legislatures.158 By comparison, 9.4% of the House of
Representatives in 2006 were African American and 5.7% were Latino; that same
year, 7.2% of state legislators were African American and 3.1% Latino.159
A possible third leg of exclusion would be if there were no legal recourse for
apparent exclusion via the VRA. As detailed in the next section, we found few
legal successes for Asian American voters under the traditional VRA criteria for
minority vote dilution. This near absence of VRA successes for a group that is
shown to be politically disempowered suggests a need to revamp the legal
standards of the VRA to better reflect fairness and equity concerns, possibly by
adopting the CCI factors that have emerged in state and federal district courts.160

156. The figures related to the 2008 CPS Voting and Registration Supplement are a result of
the authors’ primary analysis of raw survey data. Raw data are available through the ICPSR. See Current
Population Survey, November 2008: Voting and Registration Supplement, ICPSR, http://www.icpsr.umich
.edu/icpsrweb/RCMD/studies/25643 (last visited Mar. 31, 2013).
157. Id.
158. Pei-te Lien et al., The Voting Rights Act and the Election of Nonwhite Officials, PS: POL. SCI. &
POL. 489, 490–92 (2007).
159. Id.
160. The normative question of whether the VRA ought to work for Asian Americans given
that it resulted from a particular historical struggle centered around African Americans is a separate
question taken up in Part V, infra. Though not the focus of this study, we acknowledge that the
historical record on this point is conflicted. Our presumption is that the legislative history and the
legislation itself lists multiple minorities—at least after the 1975 VRA amendments concerning
language minorities—indicating a clear legislative intent that should be realized as a matter of
democratic process and traditional principles of statutory interpretation. Moreover, numerous social
scientists and historians have documented that the success of the civil rights movement was achieved
through concerted civil rights efforts on behalf of multiple racial groups, including Asian Americans.
See, e.g., MARK BRILLIANT, THE COLOR OF AMERICA HAS CHANGED: HOW RACIAL DIVERSITY
SHAPED CIVIL RIGHTS REFORM IN CALIFORNIA, 1941–1978, at 5–6 (2010); JOHN D. SKRENTNY,
THE MINORITY RIGHTS REVOLUTION 57 (2002). All of that said, by suggesting that Asian
Americans ought to be included in VRA protections, we are not saying that African Americans should
be displaced. In fact, we are rock-ribbed in resisting any inclination to view gains in the voting rights
and political power of one underrepresented group as necessitating losses for another.
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III. ASIAN AMERICANS AS A NEGATIVE “CASE”:
DEMOCRATIC EXCLUSION UNDER THE VRA AND THE GINGLES PRONGS
FOR ASSESSING MINORITY VOTE DILUTION
Why study Asian Americans as a “case” of democratic exclusion? In caseselection terms, African Americans are the archetypal case for studying the
VRA.161 This paradigm of African Americans’ political cohesion and whites’ racial
bloc voting has deep foundations in social science research.162 We know a lot
about how factors like group consciousness, linked fate, stereotyping, institutional
racism, collective mobilization, and the like define African American politics and
the dynamics of vote dilution.
We know far less about whether these processes and predispositions apply to
other groups. For example, Asian American immigration stems from a different
set of historical and ongoing social practices.163 These practices result in complex
issues of racial formation such as more in-group cultural diversity and pan-ethnic
government groupings. One scholar laments the fact that “[a]cademics, journalists,
and politicians use pan-ethnic categories (Hispanics and Asians) without
considering whether evidence exists that would justify its use. In fact, there has
been very little evidence for (or against) pan-ethnicity.”164
The analytic value of examining Asian Americans is to take a prima facie
weak case and examine whether, how, and to what extent the Gingles prongs might
apply. The starting premise for most casual observers of Asian American voters is
an abundance of skepticism, typically founded on the idea that there is simply too
much internal diversity of national origins, languages, religions, cultural
orientations, geographic concentration, and immigration histories to sustain a
legally cognizable group. Rough calculations of litigation outcomes support the
general impression that Asian Americans are overwhelmingly unsuccessful at each
stage of their section 2 voting dilution claims: only seven cases have been brought
by Asian Americans under section 2.165 The novel facts presented by the handful

161. For more on case selection, see generally John Gerring, What Is a Case Study and What Is It
Good For?, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 341 (2004); see also Bent Flyvbjerg, Case Study, in THE SAGE
HANDBOOK OF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 301, 301–14 (Norman K. Denzin & Yvonna S. Lincoln
eds., 4th ed. 2011). For an argument that African Americans are an archetypal case, see Taeku Lee,
Race, Immigration, and the Identity-to-Politics Link, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 457 (2008).
162. For a few representative examples of this capacious literature, see MICHAEL C. DAWSON,
BEHIND THE MULE: RACE AND CLASS IN AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLITICS (1994); KATHERINE
TATE, FROM PROTEST TO POLITICS: THE NEW BLACK VOTERS IN AMERICAN ELECTIONS (1993),
Jack Citrin et al., White Reactions to Black Candidates: When Does Race Matter?, 54 PUB. OPINION Q. 74
(1990), Vincent L. Hutchings & Nicholas A. Valentino, The Centrality of Race in American Politics, 7 ANN.
REV. POL. SCI. 383 (2004), Lee, supra note 161, and Ebonya Washington, How Black Candidates Affect
Voter Turnout, 121 Q.J. ECON. 973 (2006).
163. See supra Table 1; infra notes 198–206 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 192–97.
164. Michael J. Rosenfeld, The Salience of Pan-National Hispanic and Asian Identities in U.S.
Marriage Markets, 38 DEMOGRAPHY 161, 161 (2001).
165. See Katz et al., supra note 43 (documenting seven cases brought under section 2 and
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of claims involving Asian Americans all arose in the lower courts and concern asof-yet unsettled case law interpreting the application of VRA to multi-racial and
“other minority” groups.166 Other cases raise unique facts concerning Asian
American “communities of interest” where the fact patterns may be hard to
generalize.167
The paucity of Asian American–focused litigation makes systematic analysis
of potential plaintiff attributes difficult. However, it can be inferred from judicial
treatment of “other minority” groups such as Latinos that the fate of the case
rested almost entirely on how well the facts fit the Gingles criteria.168 Anecdotal or
journalistic accounts of community needs provide selective in-depth case studies
of Asian American struggles to make out a viable claim under the legal tests used
to identify and redress minority vote dilution, but they often rest upon sparse data
and an advocate’s perspective rather than an official court record.
In what follows, we examine how well Asian Americans “fit” with the
involving Asian American voters as of 2006 to 2007) and related publications from the Voting Rights
Initiative available online. Katz’s study—the most comprehensive to date—was prepared for the 2006
reauthorization of the VRA and codes cases by race among other factors. Id. Texas v. United States,
No. 11-1303 (TBG-RMC-BAH), 2012 WL 3671924 (D.D.C. Aug. 28, 2012), also involves Asian
American voters and was not included in the Katz study due to date of completion.
166. Katz et al., supra note 43; see also Cain & Miller, supra note 112, at 146. Similar trends
appear in the subset of “other minority” cases involving Latinos in some way. Cain & Miller, supra
note 112, at 146. Bearing in mind that tabulating cases that have made it to completion omit the
significant number of threatened or abandoned cases, the authors note that “it is very clear that the
‘other minority’ plaintiffs in section 2 cases and defendants in Shaw claim cases lose more than they
win.” Id.
167. There have been a few efforts to create winnable districts using a community of interest
theory. See infra Part IV. One such case, concerning New York’s Twelfth Congressional District, is
Diaz v. Silver, 978 F. Supp. 96, 129 n.22 (E.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d, 522 U.S. 801 (1997). This district
includes New York’s Chinatown. In 1997, the Eastern District of New York heard a Shaw v. Reno
challenge to the Twelfth Congressional District in New York (arguing that race was the predominant
factor in redistricting), but the court ruled that the Asian American population in the district, which
mainly encompassed Manhattan’s Chinatown and Brooklyn’s Sunset Park, constituted a common
“community of interest” and allowed it to stand as a “constitutionally permissible Asian-influence
district.” Carol Ojeda-Kimbrough et al., The Asian Americans Redistricting Project: Legal Background of the
“Community of Common Interest” Requirement, ASIAN AM. STUD. CENTER 4–5 (2009),
http://www.aasc.ucla.edu/policy/CCI_Final2.pdf; see also Glenn D. Magpantay, Asian American Voting
Rights and Representation: A Perspective from the Northeast, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 739, 766–68 (2001)
(describing defensive strategies for overcoming vote dilution and community fragmentation in New
York City and Boston Chinatowns). The Ojeda-Kimbrough report also notes community efforts to
keep the predominantly Chinese American San Gabriel Valley/Monterey Park together and to keep
Los Angeles’s Koreatown together in the 1980s to 1990s and the 2010 election cycle. OjedaKimbrough et al., supra, at 7. In the late 1980s, Korean Americans sought to challenge the Los
Angeles redistricting commission’s creation of a district that would divide Koreatown into four
separate City Council districts and five state Assembly districts, thereby diluting Korean-American
voters’ prospects for electing a Korean-American councilman. Id. In 2012, Korean activists demanded
that Koreatown be shifted into a district represented by Councilman Eric Garcetti that consists of
Thai Town and Historic Filipinotown, thereby improving the chances of electing an Asian American
candidate. See David Zahniser, Koreatown Residents Sue L.A., L.A. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2012, at AA3.
168. Cain & Miller, supra note 112, at 147.
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existing Gingles prongs. In effect, census and survey data will show grounds for
skepticism as to whether Asian Americans are a population with legitimate,
winnable claims qua a pan-ethnic group under Gingles. In the section after, we take
a fresh look at the possibilities and extent to which Asian Americans constitute a
community of common interest, irrespective of the Gingles prongs.
On compactness, Asians Americans tend to be relatively small and disperse.
The Asian American population is concentrated in certain regions of the United
States, most notably in Hawaii and California. While there is a significant
concentration of Asian Americans in California (one-third of the U.S. Asian
American population reside in California),169 Asian Americans still make up only
12% of California’s electorate (adult citizen population).170 Even at lower levels of
jurisdictional granularity, there are only eleven congressional districts in which
Asian Americans make up 20% or more of the district’s electorate.171 Of the
eleven congressional districts, all but one are in California or Hawaii.172 Among
municipalities, Asian Americans make up 25% or more of the electorate in
seventy-five districts.173
On political cohesion, the earliest exit poll data that allows estimates of the
Asian American votes show only 31% favoring the Democrat Bill Clinton in 1992
(see Figure 1). By 2012, there is a dramatic shift, with 73% reporting that they
voted for Barack Obama.174 While the shift in favor of Democratic candidates is
unmistakable, it falls significantly shy of the benchmarks set by African American
voters since the civil rights era. Yet at the same time, Asian Americans’ rates of
partisan voting today at least approximate rates seen among Latinos in Figure 1.
Moreover, even among African Americans, rates of voting for Democratic Party
candidates did not approach current heights until the 1960s, when American
National Election Study data show a jump from a 68% Democratic vote for John
F. Kennedy in the 1960 election to a reported 94% Democratic vote for Lyndon
B. Johnson in 1964.175
169. ELIZABETH M. HOEFFEL ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE ASIAN POPULATION:
2010, at 9 (2012), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-11.pdf.
170. WONG ET AL., supra note 145, at 97.
171. Id. Up though the November 2012 election, Asian Americans represented four
Congressional districts: Colleen Hanabusa (HI-1st district), Mike Honda (CA-15th), Doris Matsui
(CA-6th), and Judy Chu (CA-32nd District), with Bobby Scott (VA-3rd District), an African
American with a Filipino maternal grandfather as a potential fifth. The November 2012 election saw a
record five new Asian Americans winning Congressional seats: Ami Bera (CA-7th), Tammy
Duckworth (IL-8th), Tulsi Gabbard (HI-2nd), Grace Meng (NY-6th), and Mark Takano (CA-41st).
Mazie Hirono, formerly representing Hawaii’s 2nd district, retired to win office as Hawaii’s junior
senator.
172. Id.
173. Id. It is also worth noting that the levels of residential segregation are discernibly lower
for Asian Americans than they are for either Latinos or African Americans. See, e.g., JOHN ICELAND,
WHERE WE LIVE NOW: IMMIGRATION AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES 58–78 (2009).
174. See infra Figure 1.
175. See ZOLTAN L. HAJNAL & TAEKU LEE, WHY AMERICANS DON’T JOIN THE PARTY:
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Figure 1: Democratic Partisanship by Group, 1992 to 2012176
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There are two other key measures of the questionable political cohesiveness
of Asian American voters. First, even though there is a trend among Asian
Americans toward Democratic partisanship, this tendency is not uniform for all
constituent groups. Data from the NAAS, a pre-election survey of 5,019
respondents, showed a substantial degree of variation in partiality, ranging from
Japanese Americans and Asian Indians, who supported Barack Obama over John
McCain by a nearly four-to-one margin to Vietnamese Americans, who favored
the Republican McCain over the Democrat Obama by a nearly four-to-onemargin.177

RACE, IMMIGRATION, AND THE FAILURE (OF POLITICAL PARTIES) TO ENGAGE THE ELECTORATE
160 (2011).
176. These figures are a result of the authors’ primary analysis of raw data compiled from exit
polls conducted by Voter News Service and the National Election Pool. See National Election Pool
General Election Exit Polls, 2004, ICPSR, http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/
studies/04181/version/1 (last visited Mar. 31, 2013); National Election Pool General Election Exit Polls,
2008, ICPSR, http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/28123 (last visited Mar. 31,
2013); Voter News Service General Election Exit Polls, 1996, ICPSR, http://www.icpsr.umich
.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/6989 (last visited Mar. 31, 2013); Voter News Service General Election
Exit Polls, 2000, ICPSR, http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/3527 (last visited
Mar. 31, 2013); Voter Research and Surveys General Election Exit Polls, 1992, ICPSR, http://www.icpsr.
umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/6102 (last visited Mar. 31, 2013).
177. See infra Table 2.
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Table 2: 2008 Vote Choice by Asian American Subgroup178
Indian

Chinese

Filipino

Japanese

Korean

Vietnamese

Total

McCain

14%

15%

25%

15%

28%

51%

24%

Obama

50%

44%

32%

57%

42%

14%

39%

Uncertain

36%

41%

43%

29%

30%

35%

37%

Perhaps more notable is the remarkable degree of partisan ambivalence
among Asian American voters. More conspicuous than the two-way split between
Obama and McCain shown in Table 2 is the striking number of Asian Americans
who reported being “certain” they would vote, and yet uncertain about which
candidate they supported, even in the last few months of the election (a period
when most “horse race” polls might find 5% of likely voters who were
undecided).179
This ambivalence among likely voters is also found in the notable degree of
ambivalence about identifying with either of the two major parties in America.
Table 3 shows the responses of NAAS respondents to the question, “Generally
speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, Independent, some
other party, or do you not think in these terms?”180 The results show two key
findings. First, a significantly higher proportion of Asian Americans—almost
across all groups (except Vietnamese)—identify as Democrats than identify as
Republicans. Second, only a minority of Asian Americans identify as either a
Democrat or a Republican. In fact, the modal reply to the standard party
identification question is some form of non-identification: replying
nonidentification—that they do not think in terms of parties, indicating that they
“don’t know,” or refusing to reply altogether.

178.
179.

NAAS, 2008, supra note 149.
See, e.g., Young Voters and the Horserace, CENTER FOR INFO. & RESEARCH ON CIVIC
LEARNING & ENGAGEMENT, (Oct. 29, 2012), http://www.civicyouth.org/youth-on-horserace-52obama-v-35-romney (reporting that five percent of all likely voters were considered undecided based
on an average of national polls in the month before the 2012 presidential election).
180. Karthick Ramakrishnan et al., National Asian American Survey, 2008: Codebook, ICPSR 51
(2011), http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/31481.
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Table 3: Partisanship by Asian American Subgroup181
Indian

Chinese

Filipino

Japanese

Korean

Vietnamese

Total

Republican

8%

6%

15%

14%

20%

28%

12%

Democrat

39%

24%

33%

42%

37%

19%

31%

Independent

21%

27%

17%

15%

12%

17%

21%

Non-identifier

32%

43%

35%

29%

32%

35%

36%

Finally, on bloc voting, relevant data are harder to come by. Anecdotally,
there are several highly profiled examples of Asian American political candidates
who enjoy electoral success in majority white districts, such as current and former
governors (former Washington Governor Gary Locke, 1997 to 2005; current
Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal), current and former senators (former California
Senator S.I. Hayakawa, 1977 to 1983; current South Carolina Senator Nikki
Haley); current and former representatives (for example, former Oregon
Congressman David Wu, 1999 to 2011; former California Congressman Robert
Matsui, 1993 to 2005; current California Congresswomen Doris Matsui and Judy
Chu. These instances, albeit anecdotal and highly selective, suggest that white
voters (at least in these districts) are open to voting for an Asian American.
Looking to more representative data, public opinion polls also consistently
show that a majority of whites tend to view Asian Americans as less threatening
than other racial minority groups and see Asian Americans as facing few barriers
to equal opportunity. The NPS asked respondents whether “[t]he more influence
Asian Americans have in politics, the less influence people like me will have in
politics.”182 Only 12% of respondents agreed with this statement, compared to
34% and 33% who felt this way about the respective influence of African
Americans and Latinos in politics.183
There is one survey—the 2001 Committee of 100/Martilla study184—that
found some potential seeds of anti-Asian American bloc voting. The survey asked
white respondents “If you were voting for President of the United States, how
would you feel about voting for” candidates of different demographic traits.185 A
181. NAAS, 2008, supra note 149.
182. James S. Jackson et al., National Politics Study, 2004: Codebook, ICPSR 52 (2009), http://
www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/24483.
183. NPS, 2004, supra note 147.
184. American Attitudes Toward Chinese Americans and Asian Americans, COMMITTEE OF 100
(2001), http://www.committee100.org/publications/survey/C100survey.pdf.
185. Id. at 41.
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higher percentage reported feeling “uncomfortable” about voting for an Asian
American (23%) than voting for an African American (15%), a woman (14%) or a
Jewish American (11%).186 Another indirect source of anti-Asian American
sentiment is found in self-reports of discrimination. In the NAAS, for instance,
35% of respondents report experiencing discrimination.187 Similarly, when Asian
American respondents to the 2007 LACSS were asked to identify the “most
important problem facing Asian Americans,” the most commonly identified
problem was some mention of discrimination or race relations (20%), higher than
the incidence of mentions of immigration (9%), the economy (9%), health care
(8%), or education (8%).188
This preliminary descriptive data suggests, at first glance, that Asian
Americans fail on all three Gingles prongs, rendering them a negative case for
democratic inclusion under the VRA.189 But a closer look shows that the evidence
is mixed. Within each prong, there is evidence that a closer fit to Gingles is
emerging over time as Asian American voters adapt to more active forms of civic
life and political citizenship that is likely to make the Asian American positive case
even stronger. With regard to geographic compactness, demographic changes are
leading to high concentrations in a growing handful of districts. While we saw
earlier that there are only eleven congressional districts in which Asian Americans
rise to even 20% of the electorate, that figure represents a change from previous
decades.190 With regard to political cohesiveness, we saw in Figure 1 that Asian
Americans are becoming more partisan over time, and we shall see evidence in the
next section that they are also exhibiting greater attitudinal support for group
cohesion. With regard to polarization, we just discussed the mixed evidence for
anti-Asian sentiments and experiences of anti-Asian discrimination. Given
emerging evidence that is more mixed than conventionally believed, the
substantial underrepresentation and underparticipation merit some remedy. More
fundamentally, much of the mixed data is in need of some kind of framework to
186. Id. at 41. The Committee of 100 survey also found that white respondents were more
uncomfortable with the idea of an Asian American CEO of a Fortune 500 company and of an Asian
American supervisor at their workplace than were uncomfortable with African Americans, Jews, or
women in similar positions of power. Id. at 42.
187. NAAS, 2008, supra note 149. A 2001 survey of Asians Americans in five metropolitan
areas found a comparably high thirty-six percent of respondents who reported experiencing
discrimination. PNAAPS, 2000-2001, supra note 146. A 2001 Washington Post/Kaiser Family
Foundation/Harvard University poll found a thirty-nine percent rate. Race and Ethnicity in 2001:
Attitudes, Perceptions, and Experiences, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. 26 (2001), http://www.kff.org/
kaiserpolls/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=13839.
188. LACSS, 2007, supra note 148.
189. For further explanation of the social science terminology “negative case,” see James
Mahoney & Gary Goertz, The Possibility Principle: Choosing Negative Cases in Comparative Research, 98 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 653, 653 n.1 (2004) (defining a “negative case” as a “control” case). See also John
Gerring, Is There a (Viable) Crucial-Case Method?, 40 COMP. POL. STUD. 231 (2007) (discussing how
case-study researchers can select their cases).
190. WONG ET AL., supra note 145, at 97.
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assess whether and when Asian Americans might meet the Gingles test or
otherwise demonstrate shared political interests.191
IV. BUILDING THE POSITIVE CASE: ASIAN AMERICAN INCLUSION
AND TESTS OF MINORITY VOTE DILUTION BEYOND GINGLES
Professor Jennifer Hochschild in Race, Reform, and Regulation of Electoral Process
asks the vital question: “Do American minority groups still have ‘an’ interest?”192
After all, the seeming failure of Asian Americans to meet the Gingles threshold
requirements for a successful vote dilution claim is not inherently a problem. The
picture presented in Part III is only a problem if Asian Americans in fact share a
common interest that is lost because of empirical, conceptual, and doctrinal
problems. Empirically, there is a paucity of good data on Asian American political
participation, although the range and quality are improving. Conceptually, there is
considerable oversimplification of the processes related to group formation and
mobilization, which are critical to understanding the exclusion of minority voters.
Doctrinally, the legal standards used to interpret VRA requirements, mostly
notably Gingles, are built around an archetype of racial politics not appropriate to
other nonblack minority groups such as Asian Americans. We contend that these
conceptual, empirical, and doctrinal problems confuse the picture of democratic
inclusion for Asian Americans and impede the development of effective solutions.
To answer Hochschild’s question succinctly: we say that Asian American voters
do share common interests under certain circumstances, even if those interests are
not readily discernible under a Gingles formulation. Part IV makes the case that
applying an alternative framework to racial politics and Asian American voting
behavior yields a different picture than in Part III—one that merits democratic
inclusion for Asian Americans.
Our goal in the remainder of this section is to answer the call of voting rights
scholars to set forth an affirmative vision for overcoming minority vote dilution
by reframing inquiry around relevant interests.193 This Part proceeds in three

191. There is a degree of ambiguity in our analysis as to which of the three Gingles prongs is the
principal barrier to successful section 2 claims for Asian Americans, or whether some other mediating
or confounding factor (like geographic dispersion, lack of institutional capacity or commitment
among civil rights groups or political parties) is the key impediment. In a sense, the emphasis we place
on communities of common interest implies pride of place for political cohesion as the key here,
rather than something else. To the extent that emphasis is given to cohesion, it is the result of our
assessment of the window of opportunity presented by recent rulings that bring CCI to the
foreground and not our empirically or theoretically based claims that within-group cohesion is
foremost among multiple possible blocks to democratic inclusion. We are indebted to Christopher
Elmendorf for raising this important consideration.
192. Jennifer L. Hochschild, Overview: How, If at All, Is Racial and Ethnic Stratification Changing,
and What Should We Do About It?, in RACE, REFORM, AND REGULATION OF THE ELECTORAL
PROCESS: RECURRING PUZZLES IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 7, 14 (Guy-Uriel E. Charles, et al. eds.,
2010).
193. Pam Karlan calls on scholars to spell out an “affirmative vision” of the right to vote.
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sections. First, as a starting proposition, the VRA remedy for voting dilution turns
on a conception of common “interests” that is both underspecified and
undertheorized. To the extent that it can be unpacked, it is built around the
political experiences and behaviors of black voters. This section proposes other
potentially relevant political interests recognized in more recent and alternative
case law. Second, this section discusses a range of potentially useful measures of
common interests and presents data from several sources substantiating the
existence of shared interests among Asians in America. Third, since courts relying
on the undertheorized doctrinal tests such as Gingles miss out on other, potentially
relevant political interests, this section concludes with prescriptions for courts to
develop tests sensitive to the shared interests of a democratically excluded group
unable to experience relief under the VRA. These take the form of simple
modifications to the Gingles formula, increased attention to the “community of
common interest” requirement developed in voting rights law, and the more novel
use of graded variables and point allocation as methods for ascertaining interests.
A. Defining Asian American Political Interests
The shared basis of commonality that the VRA intends to protect consists in
part of ensuring the ability of a minority group to aggregate individual “interests”
and formulate group “identities.”194 Conceptually, we propose a framework to
redefine interests and recognize the dynamic processes leading from shared
identity to shared politics.
Interests, as traditionally defined under the VRA, consist primarily of
support for a candidate for partisan office.195 This narrow measure makes several
assumptions about minority engagement in politics that we contest in Part II. A
more nuanced picture of minority politics arises in recent jurisprudence on
minority vote dilution, with greater consideration of the specific interests
underlying racially aggregate categories recognized by lower federal courts as
“communities of common interest” and by the Supreme Court as “cultural
compactness.”196 These concepts have a venerable foundation in legal theory.
Duncan Kennedy distinguishes culture from a more biologically determined
conception of race by saying:
Communities have cultures. This means that individuals have traits that
are neither genetically determined nor voluntarily chosen, but rather
consciously and unconsciously taught through community life.

Pamela S. Karlan, The Reconstruction of Voting Rights, in RACE, REFORM, AND REGULATION OF THE
ELECTORAL PROCESS, supra note 192, at 34, 34–35.
194. Lee, supra note 161, at 458 (discussing the link between demographic identities and group
politics).
195. See id. at 469–70 (discussing the pursuit of collective group interests through political
participation).
196. Ortiz, supra note 63, at 48.
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Community life forms customs and habits, capacities to produce
linguistic and other performances, and individual understandings of good
and bad, true and false, worthy and unworthy.197
Defining interests in terms of social processes is especially important for a
group whose traits are both in flux and under formation. Asian Americans, we
submit, are just such a group. Taking a processual view of criteria like political
cohesion is necessary for a group that is overwhelmingly foreign-born or second
generation, with shifting migration patterns (both in ethnic group composition
and geographic settlement patterns), with a very high degree of internal diversity
(ethnic, linguistic, religious, cultural, political), and the like. As we saw earlier in
Figure 1, over a span of two decades and six presidential elections, Asian
American voting patterns have shifted dramatically from a strong plurality vote for
the Republican George W. Bush in 1992 to an even stronger majority vote for the
Democrat Barack Obama by 2008 and 2012.
Defining interests in terms of social processes also involves unpacking takenfor-granted assumptions about the conditions under which the voting behavior of
individuals in a polity take on the coherence and coordination of collective action.
In the history of American law and politics, these assumptions have been
recurrently animated by the freedom struggles of African Americans. Our
approach is not to challenge or replace the archetypic status of the African
American experience, but to distill that experience into its underlying constitutive
processes that define and produce a robust community of common interests.
African Americans are a “paradigmatic case” in the sense of illuminating from “an
intensive study of a single unit with an aim to generalize across a larger set of
units.”198
By understanding and unpacking what is paradigmatic about the African
American experience—studied most often vis-à-vis the dyad of black-white
relations—we are better able to know whether, when, and how some
demographically defined groups are able to crystallize into a “common thread of
relevant interests”199 while others never reach that mark. This entails unpacking
what one of us has elsewhere termed the “identity-to-politics link”—the common
premise that the demographic categories that are used to classify a population into
groups also capture shared political interests and collective political goals among
individuals defined by those categories.200 In short, the identity-to-politics link is
the premise that “African Americans” as a demographic category entails an
“African American group politics,” that “Asian American” entails an “Asian

197. Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in Legal Academia, 1990
DUKE L.J. 705, 723.
198. See Flyvbjerg, supra note 161, at 308; Gerring, supra note 161, at 352.
199. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920 (1995).
200. Lee, supra note 161, at 458.
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American group politics,” that “LGBTQ” entails an “LGBTQ group politics” and
so on.
We describe this as a premise to remind readers that communities of common
interest are not preordained by fiat of defining a bounded population and
attaching a racial label to that population. Specifying something like the identityto-politics link sets a basis for both accommodating the anti-essentialist turn of the
Court in Shaw and Miller and rejecting it. The majority opinion in Miller quotes
Shaw: “When the State assigns voters on the basis of race, it engages in the
offensive and demeaning assumption that voters of a particular race, because of
their race, ‘think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same
candidates at the polls.’”201 In many (perhaps most) cases, such an assumption will
belie the facts of pluralist politics on the ground, but in some cases, it will mirror
that reality.
We argue that specifying the identity-to-politics link helps differentiate these
two possible outcomes. Specifically, we advocate for a careful and systematic
consideration of at least five distinct links in this chain: (1) classification;
(2) identification; (3) polarization; (4) politicization; and (5) coordination.
Classification is the variation in how states and societies render the remarkable
diversity of their populations legible through rules and norms of definition and
categorization into groups. Identification is the variation in the extent to which
individuals within those demographically defined groups see the labels used to
categorize them as apt or at least serviceable. Polarization is the process by which
individuals form positive bonds of solidarity and perceive shared group
interests—in the classic conception of social identity theory, the processes of ingroup favoritism, out-group differentiation, and intergroup competition.202
Politicization is the variation in whether, when, and where those group interests are
pursued in political arenas (rather than economic, social, or cultural arenas).
Finally, coordination is the variation in whether, when, and where mobilization and
action are collective. In effect, this last step of coordination is what is sought as
evidence of political cohesion—the outcome of an overriding proportion of a
group voting according to their collective interests. Specifying these links not only
allows us to better understand the precursors to the observed outcome of interest,
201. Miller, 515 U.S. at 911–12 (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 629, 647 (1993)); see also
Taeku Lee, From Shared Demographic Categories to Common Political Destinies: Immigration and the Link from
Racial Identity to Group Politics, 4 DU BOIS REV. 433, 434 (2007); Lee, supra note 161, at 458.
202. Not all three aspects of social identity formation necessarily travel together; you can
develop a sense of ingroup positive distinctiveness without antipathy toward or competition with a
defined outgroup. See GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 29 (1954); Marilynn B.
Brewer, The Psychology of Prejudice: Ingroup Love or Outgroup Hate?, 55 J. SOC. ISSUES 429, 430 (1999)
(arguing that “ingroup favoritism and outgroup prejudice are separable phenomena”); see also Henri
Tajfel & John C. Turner, The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior, in PSYCHOLOGY OF
INTERGROUP RELATIONS 7, 13 (Stephen Worchel & William G. Austin eds., 2d ed. 1986) (stating
that “incompatible group interests . . . are not always necessary for development of competition and
discrimination between groups”).
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but also to better diagnose the barriers to achieving political cohesion when it is
not observed.
In the archetypical case of African Americans, the links in this chain are well
fortified through centuries of disadvantage, contemporary modes of
discrimination, and the collective efforts of mobilization against them. For Asian
Americans, as we discuss below, the notion of a collective of Asian Americans qua
Asian Americans is, a priori, far more tenuous. While Asian Americans occupy one
corner of America’s “ethno-racial pentagon,”203 beneath that pan-ethnic unifying
thread lies a remarkably rich diversity of constituent and concurrently shifting
groups. Even at the “classification” stage, various U.S. federal agencies define
“Asian” to denote individuals from the Far East, Southeast Asia, or the Indian
Subcontinent and individuals who self-identify racially as “Asian Indian,”
“Chinese,” “Filipino,” “Korean,” “Japanese,” “Vietnamese,” or “Other Asian”
(for example, Burmese, Cambodians, Hmong, Lao, Pakistani, and Thai).204 With
the 2000 census, Native Hawaiians and Pacific Islanders began to be classified
separately from Asians.205
Moreover, these categories have not remained constant or consistent over
time. In just the last half century, the Census Bureau’s ethno-racial classification
system has been successively remade.206 In 1960, we saw a shift from enumerator
observation (that is, having a trained census worker visit your home and code your
identity) to respondent self-identification.207 In the 1970 and 1980 census,
a separate question identifying Americans of Hispanic origin emerged.208 The

203. See HOLLINGER, supra note 109, at 8.
204. See, e.g., Taeku Lee, Between Social Theory and Social Science Practice: Toward a New Approach to
the Survey Measurement of “Race,” in MEASURING IDENTITY: A GUIDE FOR SOCIAL SCIENTISTS 113, 115
(Rawi Abdelal et al. eds., 2009) (listing ethnoracial classifications used throughout the history of the
U.S. Census).
205. Revisions to the Standards for the Classification of Federal Data on Race and Ethnicity,
62 Fed. Reg. 58, 782 (Oct. 30, 1997).
206. On changing ethno-racial classification and its contribution to shifting processes of
group-making, see, for example, LÓPEZ, supra note 81, at 161 (discussing how questioning previously
established assumptions of physicality led to hearings on the addition of a “multiracial” category to
the census), MELISSA NOBLES, SHADES OF CITIZENSHIP: RACE AND THE CENSUS IN MODERN
POLITICS 16 (2000) (discussing the Office of Management and Budget’s defining races for the
purposes of the census), MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED
STATES: FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990S 3 (2nd ed. 1994) (noting the census’s variance in
enumerated racial categories over the decades), Mary C. Waters, ETHNIC OPTIONS: CHOOSING
IDENTITIES IN AMERICA 9 (1990) (discussing the efforts of white-ethnic groups in the 1970s to have
an ethnic ancestry question added to the census), Joane Nagel, American Indian Ethnic Renewal: Politics
and the Resurgence of Identity, 60 AM. SOC. REV. 947, 947 (1995) (examining “the phenomenon of ethnic
identity change and the role of politics in prompting the reconstruction of individual ethnicity”), and
Kenneth Prewitt, Race in the 2000 Census: A Turning Point, in THE NEW RACE QUESTION: HOW THE
CENSUS COUNTS MULTIRACIAL INDIVIDUALS, supra note 98, at 354, 354–60 (Joel Perlmann & Mary
Waters eds., 2003) (discussing trends in racial identity classifications).
207. Lee, supra note 161, at 460.
208. Id.
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categories of Asians, Pacific Islanders, American Indians, Native Hawaiians, and
Alaska Natives proliferated in the 1980 and 1990 census.209 Starting in the 2000
census, all Americans were given the ability to choose more than one among these
categories. 210 These changes—as is typically so with bureaucratic efforts to make
societies legible through standardization and commensuration—both mirror the
growing diversity of America’s population and contribute to its making.211
We argue that it is precisely because the idea of group-based exclusion and
group identity for Asian Americans as Asian Americans seems so thinly wrought—
especially by comparison to that of African Americans—that Asian Americans
represent an especially key test case for examining the identity-to-politics link. Of
course, if it were true that Asian Americans never faced barriers to participation or
mobilized collectively as Asian Americans, the test case would fade away as
ephemera. In fact, there have been numerous well-documented cases in which
Asian Americans have come together as a pan-ethnic collectivity to protest their
unfair treatment and to act in concert on a political cause.212 To be more specific,
then, Asian Americans are a key test case because while prima facie expectations
are weak, Asian Americans are a dynamic (that is, rapidly growing) population
that, under the right circumstances, exhibits collective action on common
interests. In this historical moment that we are in, fast-moving demographic
changes coupled to pivotal events can often act as critical junctures that spur
defining and durable shifts in group boundaries, intergroup relations, and their
relevance to existing voting rights jurisprudence.
In addition, Asian Americans are also akin to a “most different” or a
“negative case” as compared to African Americans.213 Both groups, to varying
degrees, are viewed by others in totalizing, homogenous terms despite a lived
reality that is far richer.214 Yet their histories of exclusion and their standing in the
American racial order are distinct from one another. Claire Kim, for instance,
argues that Asian Americans are uniquely situated in a position of “relative
209. Id. at 461.
210. Id.
211. On commensuration generally, see Wendy Nelson Espeland & Mitchell L. Stevens,
Commensuration as a Social Process, 24 ANN. REV. SOC. 313, 315 (1998) (defining commensuration as
measuring characteristics usually represented by different units along a common metric), and IAN
HACKING, THE TAMING OF CHANCE 161 (1990) (measuring the characteristics of human nature
according to “normal people”).
212. See YEN LE ESPIRITU, ASIAN AMERICAN PANETHNICITY: BRIDGING INSTITUTIONS
AND IDENTITIES 134–60 (1992) (enumerating examples of pan-Asian organization in response to
anti-Asian violence); Dina Okamoto & Kim Ebert, Beyond the Ballot: Immigrant Collective Action in
Gateways and New Destinations in the United States, 57 SOC. PROBLEMS 529, 535 (2010) (explaining how
the occupational segregation of Asian ethnic groups from whites fostered pan-ethnic interests and
facilitated organizing efforts); Dina G. Okamoto, Towards a Theory of Panethnicity: Explaining Asian
American Collective Action, 68 AM. SOC. REV. 811, 820 (2003) (noting that fifty-nine of 375 documented
collective action events involving Asian Americans were pan-ethnic).
213. See Mahoney & Goertz, supra note 189.
214. See Chang, supra note 113, at 15–18 (discussing nativistic racism).
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valorization” as a “model minority” vis-à-vis other minority groups like African
Americans.215 Thus, public discourse is rife with tropes of the exemplary rise of
Asian Americans to socioeconomic success compared to the experiences of
Latinos and African Americans. Yet at the same time, Kim also finds Asian
Americans “civically ostracized” and subject to continued suspicions of being
“perpetual foreigners” and “strangers in a strange land.”216 One implication here is
the potential that the prevalence of narratives of relative valorization crowds out
the presence and persistence of various modes of exclusion from civic, economic,
and political life.
There is potential for discovering more shared interests in the context of a
multiracial, multiethnic electorate by re-examining some of the weaker links as
applied to nonblack minority groups such as Asian Americans. In the case of
Asian Americans, additional difficulties are presented along the lines of group
formation and mobilization. As Asian American and racial politics scholars have
explained, group formation is a precursor to politics. For example, sociologists
Michael Omi and Howard Winant have shown in influential work that racial
formation, especially for a pan-ethnic group such as Asian Americans, is a
complex social process rather than a given.217 “The designation of racial categories
and the determination of racial identity is no simple task.”218 “Although the
concept of race invokes biologically based human characteristics (so-called
phenotypes), selection of these particular human features for purposes of racial
signification is always and necessarily a social and historical process . . . by which
racial categories are created, inhabited, transformed, and destroyed.”219 The
process is obscured by reductionist racial classifications traditionally used in law,
government data, and social science scholarship that aggregate multi- or panethnic subgroups.220 To the extent that the social process of racial formation can
be elucidated for Asian Americans, possibilities for enhancing group participation
in politics can be identified.
Once a racial group has coalesced around a common identity, further
mobilization is required to bolster representation in the electoral process. A key
component of mobilization is the transformation of shared racial identity into a
shared political identity, which in American politics means partisan
identification.221 “Decades of initiatives by the Democratic Party in support of the

215. Kim, supra note 115, at 117.
216. Id. at 126.
217. See OMI & WINANT, supra note 206, at 53–76 (1994) (discussing the historical aspects of
racial formation and its ties to the evolution of hegemony).
218. Id. at 54.
219. Id. at 55–56.
220. See LÓPEZ, supra note 81, at 160 (discussing an individual’s denial of citizenship on the
basis of the racial identity assigned to him by the court).
221. See HAJNAL & LEE, supra note 175, at 16 (noting percentages of Latinos and Asians who
are willing to place themselves along the political spectrum and voting rate).
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civil rights movement and other causes important to the African American
community have created a widely held perception that the Democratic Party is the
party of minority interests.”222 However, Hajnal and Lee have demonstrated that
growing numbers of Americans, including a majority of Asian Americans and
Latinos, do not identify with either of the two parties.223 One of the key
implications of the majority of nonpartisans among Asian Americans vis-à-vis
voting rights is that institutional barriers need not be as visible as poll taxes or
literacy tests to have an exclusionary effect. Rather, institutional neglect can be
every bit as effective. Moreover, the trend of partisan disaffiliation is neither
inevitable nor irreversible. Outreach from the political parties can connect
minority groups to electoral politics. But historic electoral neglect of Asian
Americans from political parties thwarts possibilities for increased participation
and, consequently, representation in a party-driven electoral system.224 Building an
institutional infrastructure to link Asian Americans with the party system can
bolster resultant representation.
In the ensuing sections, we present a fresh look at the possibilities and extent
to which Asian Americans constitute a community of common interest. As a
requisite caveat, we first note that one persistent thorn in the side of the kind of
analysis we have endeavored to present here is the incomplete and often
unavailable data on Asian Americans. To start with the standard and typically
authoritative source of individual-level data on voter registration and voter
turnout, the CPS, conducts interviews in only two languages—English and
Spanish.225 Nearly two-thirds of Asian Americans are foreign born and one in
three are limited in their English proficiency.226 Within certain groups like
Vietnamese, Hmong, Cambodians, Laotians, Taiwanese, Koreans, and Chinese,
roughly half or more are classified as having “limited English proficiency.”227
Research on Latino Americans demonstrates that the language of the interview
not only produces significant and substantive differences in what people say on
surveys, but these differences are also quite persistent and pervasive.228 Our

222. Id. at 4 (citation omitted).
223. Id. (citing NAAS, 2008, supra note 149, for the finding that only 46% of Asian
Americans identify with either political party and the 2006 Latino Political Survey for a similar finding
that only 44% of Latinos engage in partisan identification—these majorities are “non-identifiers”
rather than Independents).
224. See April Chung, Comment, Noncitizen Voting Rights and Alternatives: A Path Toward Greater
Asian Pacific American and Latino Political Participation, 4 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 163, 172 (1996)
(discussing neglect of Asian Pacific Americans and Latinos by political candidates and government
officials).
225. See Lee et al., supra note 138 (discussing use of only English and Spanish for the Current
Population Survey Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System).
226. SCHMIDLEY, supra note 139.
227. PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY COMM., supra note 140.
228. See Johnson et al., supra note 141.
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approach below is to use the NAAS along with other relevant datasets—the best
data available, when available, and with appropriate rejoinders on their limitations.
B. Measuring Shared Interests and Identities
Using more refined measures and broader sources of information will
capture still other bases of shared political interest. One possibility is to look to
attitudinal sources of evidence of emerging interests. Compared to U.S. census
reporting and other forms of commonly used data, data from the three key
surveys—the NPS, the LACSS, and the NAAS—provide some of the most
comprehensive information about Asian American voting behavior. We highlight
in this section a few among the many measures that indicate a basis for shared
commonality:
 A solid majority of Asian Americans view their lot in life as linked to the
fate of other Asians;
 Asian Americans are more likely than African Americans or Latinos (at
least in Los Angeles County) to see political power as an important
means to achieve group interests; and
 Asian Americans are more likely than blacks and Latinos (again, in Los
Angeles County) to vote for a co-ethnic candidate, ceteris paribus.
These snapshots into Asian American common interests capture the key
stages of polarization, politicization, and coordination that come at the end of the
identity-to-politics chain. We start with the premise that polarization entails salient
social group identities, with the activation of commonality within a group and the
sharpened differentiation between groups.229 In surveys, this is often glimpsed
through measures of “linked fate” by asking respondents, “Do you think what
happens generally to other Asians in this country affects what happens in your
life?”230 The underlying concept here is that individuals with an activated sense of
collective identity engage in what political scientist Michael Dawson terms a
“racial group calculus.”231 One’s racial or ethnic group membership serves as a
229. Social identity theory, as a theory, argues that intergroup dynamics like group polarization
can be explained through processes of social categorization, such as in-group favoritism, out-group
differentiation, and inter-group competition. See Henri Tajfel, Experiments in Intergroup Discrimination,
223 SCI. AM. 96, 96 (1970); Tajfel & Turner, supra note 202. Identity here is thought of as “that part of
an individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a group (or
groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to the membership.” HENRI
TAJFEL, DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN SOCIAL GROUPS: STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
INTERGROUP RELATIONS 63 (1978). Identity is thus the collective dimension of one’s sense of self
and it is both meaningful and cherished. Humans are wired to strive for a positive sense of their social
self by endeavoring to optimize the distinctiveness between an in-group and relevant out-groups. As
Tajfel famously shows, this striving is so ubiquitous that “groupness” can be defined and defended
over boundaries as seemingly inconsequential and arbitrary as preferring the art of Kandinsky over
Klee. See Tajfel, supra, at 107.
230. See, e.g., Ramakrishnan et al., supra note 180, at 59.
231. See DAWSON, supra note 162, at 66–67 (discussing calculations of racial utility); see also
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heuristic for one’s interests such that in asking a question like, what is best for
me?, individuals with a strong sense of linked fate will ask, as a short-cut, the
question, what is best for people like me?
This measure of “linked fate” has been shown to be one of the most
consistent and powerful predictors of black public opinion and voting behavior.232
It has also been shown as a fairly robust predictor of the political attitudes and
race relations of Latino Americans and, in some contexts, Asian Americans as
well.233
Figure 2: Perceptions of Linked Fate, by Racial/Ethnic Group234
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TATE, supra note 162, at 24–25, 45–49 (discussing effects of race identification among Blacks on
policy choices).
232. DAWSON, supra note 162, at 61.
233. On Latinos, see Paula D. McClain et al., Racial Distancing in a Southern City: Latino
Immigrants’ Views of Black Americans, 68 J. POL. 571, 577–82 (2006). See also Dennis Chong & Reuel
Rogers, Reviving Group Consciousness, in THE POLITICS OF DEMOCRATIC INCLUSION, supra note 155,
at 45, 48–49 (discussing the effects of group consciousness on Latinos and Asians); Gabriel R.
Sanchez, Latino Group Consciousness and Perceptions of Commonality with African Americans, 89 SOC. SCI. Q.
428, 431–39 (2008). On Asian Americans, see Jane Junn & Natalie Masuoka, Asian American Identity:
Shared Racial Status and Political Context, 6 PERSP. ON POL. 729, 731 (2008). See also Natalie Masuoka,
Together They Become One: Examining the Predictors of Panethnic Group Consciousness Among Asian Americans
and Latinos, 87 SOC. SCI. Q 993, 995–96 (2006).
234. NPS, 2004, supra note 147.
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What is less well shared is the significant proportion of Asian Americans
who also demonstrate a robust sense of shared destiny. Indeed, Figure 2 shows
that a much higher proportion of African Americans believe that their fates are
strongly linked to other African Americans than any other group; when the
strength of that connection is expanded from “a lot” to include both “a lot” and
“some,” nearly 60% of Asian Americans report a sense of shared well-being.
Notably, this proportion is comparable to that of African Americans (62%) and
higher than that of Latinos (42%) and whites (52%).
Figure 3: Political Power as a Means to Group Interest,
by Racial/Ethnic Group235
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Second, it may be the case that Asian Americans, in high proportions, see
their destinies as interconnected, but through other means than political. The 2007
LACSS asked respondents, “How effectively do you think elections and political
power is as a means of pursuing” their racial group’s interests?236 At least among
Angelenos, Asian Americans report in even higher measure that they view political
power as a means to furthering their group interest. More than 80% of Asian
Americans report that political power is either “somewhat effective” or “very

235.
236.

LACSS, 2007, supra note 148.
Sawyer et al., supra note 148, at 88.
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effective.”237 This is higher than the combined totals for Latinos (65%) and even
blacks (75%).238
Figure 4: Willingness to Vote for a Co-Ethnic Candidate,
by Racial/Ethnic Group239
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As a third cut into Asian American common political interests, we
distinguish between a generalized sense of the relevance of political action and a
direct willingness to act on the basis of that sentiment. The LACSS also asked its
respondents, “Suppose you have an opportunity to decide on two candidates for
political office, one of whom is [from the respondents’ racial group]. Would you
be more likely to vote for [that candidate]?”240 Asian Americans report the highest
willingness to vote for co-ethnic candidates. More than 70% said “yes” (compared
to just over 60% of Latinos and blacks) and an additional 10% said “maybe” or
“don’t know,” bringing the combined willingness to 80% (compared to 75% for
blacks and 70% for Latinos).241

237. See supra Figure 3.
238. See id. To be candid, this measure is somewhat limited by the fact that responses are not
calibrated by how effective Asian Americans might view other means of pursuing collective interests,
such as in economic, social, cultural arenas. A better format for measuring politicization would be
a question that requires trade-offs or contingent valuation between these various modes of pursuing
a group’s interests.
239. LACSS, 2007, supra note 148.
240. Sawyer et al., supra note 148, at 88.
241. See supra Figure 4. See generally CELINDA LAKE ET AL., LAKE RESEARCH PARTNERS,
ASIAN AMERICAN SURVEY 14 (2012) (additional support for emerging partisan identification and
coalescence).
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Opinion surveys are admittedly only one among several ways of defining and
observing communities of interest. There are well-researched limitations to the
validity and reliability of information accessed through surveys, such as the bias in
responses due to social desirability, the particularities of question wording and
ordering, the language of an interview, the race and gender of an interviewer, the
tendency to overreport civically valued behaviors such as voting and underreport
socially proscribed beliefs such as stereotyping and the like.242 On this point, we
appreciate the contribution of the UCLA Asian Americans Redistricting Project in
laying out other possible methodologies for observing a CCI.243 They include both
quantitative and qualitative techniques suitable for producing and analyzing a wide
range of data sources. Some of these techniques include conducting stakeholder
surveys (to ascertain media usage and non-electoral forms of electoral
engagement), collecting official data on voting patterns from government sources,
engaging in organizational analysis (to ascertain connections to economic
institutions, social networks, and exposure to public safety risks), and performing
secondary data analysis (to ascertain education, homeownership, mode of
transportation, and language).244

242. For a general introduction to these biases, see ROBERT M. GROVES ET AL., SURVEY
METHODOLOGY 269–98 (2d ed. 2009) (discussing survey interviewing and its potential biases). See
generally Nora Cate Schaeffer & Stanley Presser, The Science of Asking Questions, 29 ANN. REV. SOC. 65
(2003) (discussing how the context and structure of survey questions can affect responses to those
questions).
243. Bing He et al., Asian Americans Redistricting Project: Accessing Secondary Data, ASIAN AM.
STUD. CENTER (2009), http://www.aasc.ucla.edu/policy/Secondary%20Data_Final(2).pdf; OjedaKimbrough et al., supra note 166; Paul M. Ong et al., Asian Americans Redistricting Project: Accessing
Registration and Voting Data, ASIAN AM. STUD. CENTER (2009), http://www.aasc.ucla.edu/policy/
Voting_Final(2).pdf [hereinafter Ong et al., Accessing Registration]; Paul M. Ong et al., Asian Americans
Redistricting Project: Conducting Stakeholder Surveys, ASIAN AM. STUD. CENTER (2009), http://www.aasc
.ucla.edu/policy/Stakeholder_Final(2).pdf [hereinafter Ong et al., Conducting Stakeholder Surveys].
244. See sources cited supra note 243.
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Figure 5: Methodologies for Ascertaining Communities
of Common Interest Factors245
Research Methodology
Criteria
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x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x

x
x

x
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x

x

x

x
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Environmental Risks
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x

x

x
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x
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Secondary data is information attained from an external source such as the
American Community Survey (ACS) or U.S. census. Secondary data contains
information in the aggregate (summary data for a particular geographic area or
population in the form of tabulations, percentages, and averages) or microdata
(broken down to individual data points and responses) on issues like income,
education, housing, and other demographics. The benefit of secondary data is that

245.

Adapted from Table 1.1 from Ojeda-Kimbrough et al., supra note 167, at 12.
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it has been collected according to widely accepted research methods and uses large
sample sizes and extensive training that minimize bias. The information is
relatively easily and inexpensively obtained by researchers as compared to the
process of collecting of primary data.246
Political information about voting patterns complements U.S. census and ACS
data when trying to determine whether a neighborhood should be considered a
community of common interest. It might include information about partisan
affiliation and election results by candidate or ballot initiative. In addition, voting
data can be used to determine if a neighborhood is currently kept intact or
fragmented by electoral districts drawn in a previous round of redistricting,
indicating potential challenges to political power for the next round of
redistricting.247
Organizational analysis involves the in-depth study of neighborhood
institutions such as churches and community centers to obtain a sense of social
networks. In the Koreatown example, UCLA researchers looked at the attendees
of a neighborhood church and the users of a neighborhood social service. Two
questions were asked: (1) What proportion of the church members or social
service users reside in the hypothesized community of common interest? And (2)
How does the organization define its activities and identity vis-à-vis the
neighborhood?248 Similar assessments of community needs have engaged public
testimony through participatory forums such as the Independent Citizen
Commission enacted by California voters under Propositions 11 and 20.249
Finally, the potential uses of surveys themselves are far from exhausted. While
surveys are a relatively more labor-intensive means of gathering information than
using pre-existing data, they allow researchers to design their data collection in
ways that avoid the limitations of pre-existing data. So long as surveys are able to
draw a representative sample of Asian Americans, researchers have close to carte
blanche in their ability to use surveys to properly portray even as elusive and
organic an entity as a “community of common interest.” For example, the NAAS
links up immigration status to naturalization, voter registration, electoral
participation, participation in non-electoral politics, varieties of civic, religious, and
transnational activism, reliance on ethnic media and ethnic institutions, selfreports of discrimination and hate crimes victimization, and mobilization by
political parties and their candidates.
We close this section by describing a particularly promising example of the

246. He et al., supra note 243, at 2.
247. See Ong et al., Accessing Registration, supra note 243, at 2.
248. See E-mail from Paul Ong, Professor, UCLA Luskin Sch. of Pub. Affairs, to authors
(Aug. 3, 2012, 09:57 PST) (on file with authors).
249. See Mac Donald & Cain, supra note 49 (manuscript at 6, 7). For more examples of Asian
American CCI consideration, see Minnis, supra note 15, at 38–39 (describing 2011 redistricting
challenges in California and Michigan).
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kind of innovation possible through carefully designed surveys: a graded variable
approach toward discerning racial identities.250 The starting premise is this: the
critical task for courts when taking race into account in vote dilution cases is
disaggregating relevant interests that are correlated with political preferences and
merit legal protection in voting law. Existing ways of measuring race (even in most
previous surveys) fail to convey this information for Asian Americans because
they are too blunt. In effect, there are two primary features of a person’s racial
identity that are relevant to assessing polarized voting: one is which group or groups
one identifies with, and the other is how strongly one identifies with that group or
groups. Most data collection previous to the 2000 decennial census was first
limited by a “singularity constraint” in which individuals, no matter how
multiracial their heritage, were expected to choose just one among a menu of racial
identities. Since the introduction of the “mark one or more” response option with
the 2000 census, most social and political surveys have followed suit with some
means of allowing for individuals to identify with multiple races.
What is still missing in surveys is an accurate way of assessing the
“equivalency constraint” in measurement. This constraint presumes that when two
people choose, say, “Asian American” as a racial identity that defines them, the
two people identify equally as “Asian American.” Similarly, it presumes that when
two people choose different categories (say, “Asian American” in one instance and
“white” in another), they share nothing in common with respect to their “Asianness” or “whiteness.” This constraint is not limited only to how many racial groups
someone identifies with, but also limited to how strongly they identify with the
groups that define them. The graded variables approach that one of the authors
has developed allows for more granular information about group interests.251 The
intuition behind it is to allow not only for racial identities to be multiple—as the
decennial census, ACS, and many post-2000 social surveys do—but to allow for
those multiple attachments to vary in their intensity.
The approach here is directly analogous to Lani Guinier’s proposal for
“cumulative voting.”252 Both “one-person, one-vote” electoral systems and “oneperson, one category” racial classification systems share the singularity and
equivalence constraints. Just as it can limit electoral choice to require voters to
choose just one candidate when they might hold measured positive valences for
more than one candidate, so too it limits racial identification to require individuals
to select one “race” when their history and current experience is more diverse.
Similarly, just as cumulative voting allows citizens to vote for multiple candidates

250. For prior approaches to graded variables, see Lee, supra note 204, at 115–19 (listing some
of the racial gradations used in past censuses).
251. See id., at 119–28 (describing the graded variables approach to ethno-racial selfidentification).
252. LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 14 (1994).
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and weigh their votes according to their intensities of preference across
candidates,253 a graded approach to racial identities allows individuals to identify
with multiple racial categories if they see fit and to weigh those identifications as
they see fit.254
To the extent that one’s membership in a racial group is, at least to an extent,
volitional and interest-based, this graded approach allows us to more accurately
assess how commonly those interests run across all members of a putative group.
This approach notably has a potentially wide range of applications to our
understanding of race/ethnicity and social divisions more broadly. It allows a
potentially more nuanced measure within an identity class (for example, how the
categories of “African American,” “white,” “Asian American,” “Latino,” and
“Native American” are negotiated), across different identity classes (for example,
between race, ethnicity, gender, class, sexuality, ideology, religiosity, partisanship)
within a putative identity category (for example, between one’s pan-ethnic identity
as “Asian American” and one’s ethnic/national origin attachments as “Filipino” or
“Vietnamese”), and between the process of self-identification and external
ascription of one’s race. The approach was developed primarily for use in survey
measurement, with striking results in our estimates of the prevalence of multiracial
self-identification.255
For present purposes, this approach is especially promising as a means to
better understand why some Asian Americans identify vigorously and consistently
over time as Asian Americans qua a community of common interests while others
do not do so. To what extent is such an organic, graded “sense of self” defined by
factors such as Asian Americans’ ethnic subgroups, the language they speak at
home, their consumption of ethnic media, the neighborhood in which they live,
their socioeconomic status, their access to basic social services, their political
voice, and perhaps even their identification with attitudinal statements such as “I
have experienced discrimination in voting”? If the search for relevant
characteristics of discrete subsets within a heterogeneous multiracial voting
population is seen as a valid enterprise,256 this graded variables approach enables
us to test “which identities matter and how much they matter within an identity
class.”257 For example, a survey can illuminate the relevance of income level within
the Latin communities of Rio Grande and Austin, Texas Latino communities (in
LULAC)258 or the extent to which ethnic media is consulted across Manhattan
253. Id.
254. Lee, supra note 204, at 113–14.
255. See id. at 128 (describing the 2003 Golden Bear Omnibus survey). In this context, simply
allowing survey respondents to view their racial identity in more graded terms alters our statistical
estimates of the proportion of Californians of multiracial descent from the 4.7% in the 2000 census to
roughly 26%. Id. at 130, 130 n.14.
256. See Magpantay, supra note 167, at 765–69.
257. Lee, supra note 204, at 120 (emphasis added).
258. LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 423 (2006).
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Chinatown and Brooklyn’s Sunset Park Chinese communities (in Diaz).259 It can
help clarify which identities matter across identity classes (for example, between
race, class, partisanship, and perceived challenges and opportunities within a
neighborhood).260 A survey might also help make the case for a coalition of Asian
and Latino groups in Los Angeles who share a preference for a minority candidate
that prioritizes immigration reform over other policy platforms. And it sorts out
the relevance of pan-ethnic versus ethnic or national origin subgroups known to
be important cleavages in the Asian American community.261 Other possibilities
might be developed that align with relevant political behaviors, at least some of
which may be incorporated into legal doctrine.262
C. Reforming Legal Tests to Reflect Redefined Interests
The legal tests under the VRA should be modified or supplemented with the
above-identified approaches to discerning whether a community of common
interests exists and whether those interests are being defeated under currently
defined jurisdictions. Minor improvements could be made to the Gingles factors to
reflect changing patterns of minority politics and/or appropriate qualifications
could be made about their relevance to other protected groups (who may require
alternate or additional tests of vote dilution). One example is the notion of
“cultural compactness” to modify prong one of Gingles in LULAC.263
Other possible modifications have been recognized by lower federal courts
and state courts, including the requirement in Bush v. Vera264 and Diaz265 that
defeating a claim of racial gerrymandering requires line drawers to consider
evidence that a “community of common interest” existed at the time of district
drawing (not merely afterwards, as a pretext for race-based districting). Often the
claim will arise as a restraint on suspected gerrymandering, but sometimes it will
arise as reason to permit redistricting where a minority group otherwise has
difficulty remaining intact. While the Supreme Court has not defined communities
of common interest in specific terms or tests, lower federal and state courts have
recognized several factors as indicative of “communities of common interest.”266
Some of these factors include the following:
259. Diaz v. Silver, 978 F. Supp. 96, 101 (E.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d, 522 U.S. 801 (1997).
260. Lee, supra note 204, at 120.
261. Id.
262. See id. at 142 (discussing some possibilities for further developing the graded variables
survey instrument).
263. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 430–35.
264. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 961–65 (1996).
265. Diaz v. Silver, 978 F. Supp. 96, 129 n.22 (E.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d, 522 U.S. 801 (1997).
266. See, e.g., LULAC, 548 U.S. at 426; Diaz , 978 F. Supp. at 102–26. In support of the
exercise of identifying such criterion, Glenn Magpantay says, “Drawing districts on the basis of Asian
American communities of interest is not simply a legal fiction nor a proxy for race. Asian American
communities of interest may be viewed as smaller subsets of the Asian American community.”
Magpantay, supra note 167, at 768 (footnote omitted).
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1.

Common language and institutions. For instance, use of common
Chinese dialect and Chinese-language newspapers, and school and
church attendance;267
2. Homologous socioeconomic status. For instance, educational
background, employment and economic patterns, housing patterns, and
living conditions;268
3. Comparable immigration histories. For instance, being an immigrant or
a naturalized citizen,269 and refugee Cambodians;270
4. Shared social services and public goods. For instance, riding the same
subway lines, using the same private and municipal health and social
service agencies,271 and sending children to the same schools; and
5. Parallel experiences of discrimination. For instance, the experience
addressed in U.S. v. City of Hamtramck, in which claims were brought on
behalf of Arab Americans and darker-skinned Asian Americans whose
voting qualifications were challenged.272
As a “proof of concept” of this approach of reforming legal tests towards a
more capacious view of factors that may predispose a population into emerging as
a community of common interest, we conclude this section with some initial
evidence from the NAAS. To foreshadow, we find that, to varying degrees, these
CCI factors are in fact associated with survey-based measures of Asian American
commonality. Not all five CCI factors above are equally well assessed using
individual survey data, and so we are selective about the relationships we show,
and these findings are intended for illustrative purposes only. More specifically, we
focus on two factors that ought to resonate, pari passu, with the formation of an
Asian American CCI: the extent to which they are linguistically isolated, and the
degree to which they experience discrimination as Asian Americans. To assess
common interests at the individual level, we rely on two items in the NAAS:
respondents’ perceptions that their fates are interconnected with that of the group

267. Diaz , 978 F. Supp. at 102.
268. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 426; Diaz , 978 F. Supp. at 124.
269. Id. at 126.
270. Magpantay, supra note 167, at 768.
271. Diaz , 978 F. Supp. at 126.
272. Complaint at 3, United States v. City of Hamtramck, No. 00-73541 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 4,
2000). It is also necessary to reckon with factors involved in the strategy of forging cross-racial or
multi-racial coalition districts, for example, across Asian American subethnic groups and together
with African American and Latino communities. The result might not be self-representation or
descriptive representation, but could still satisfy the criterion of “candidate of choice” through
substantive representation of interests. See Ramakrishnan et al., supra note 180, at 62–67. See generally
Frank J. Macchirola & Joseph G. Diaz, Minority Political Empowerment in New York City: Beyond the Voting
Rights Act, 108 POL. SCI. Q. 37, 50–52 (1993) (discussing the 1991 redistricting of New York City with
regard to Asian Americans and Latinos). For further discussion of Asian Americans and minority
coalitions, see Minnis, supra note 15, at 35 (describing a three-way coalition of Asian American,
Latino, and African American voters in Prince Williams County, Virginia among other examples).
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they identify with, and respondents’ views about what basis of commonality Asian
Americans share. The first measure of “linked fate,” which we saw earlier in
Figure 2, tells us whether Asian Americans see, cognitively, a basis for shared
interests. In the 2008 NAAS, the specific question wording is, “Do you think what
happens generally to other Asians in this country affects what happens in your
life?”273 If respondents concur, they are then asked whether the effect is “a lot,”
“some,” or “not very much.”274 The second measure is how Asian Americans
view their commonality to one another. Respondents are asked, “What, if anything
do Asians in the United States share with one another? Would you say they share a
common race, a common culture, common economic interests, common political
interests?” Unlike the linked fate items, which ask directly about a person’s own
sense of solidarity with others, these measures are indirect and ask respondents to
assess what they think bind Asian Americans together. These items cohere
reasonably well together as an additive index (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.68).275
How is linguistic isolation and unfair treatment to perceptions of Asian
American commonality? To assess the association of language with group
interests, we examined the extent to which respondents to the NAAS relied on
ethnic (non-English language) media sources for their political information. Here,
respondents are asked whether they rely on newspapers, radio, television, or
online sources for their political information.276 When the replies are affirmative,
respondents are then asked whether the content of those media sources is in an
Asian language or in English.277 These items cohere fairly well as an additive scale
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.72). Notably, this institutional measure of language
isolation is positively associated with one’s sense of shared interests by both
measures of commonality, shown below in Figures 6 and 7.

273. Ramakrishnan et al., supra note 180, at 59.
274. Id. at 60. The 2008 NAAS also asks respondents if “what happens generally” to other coethnics (for example, fellow Chinese, Filipinos, Vietnamese) affects their life. Id. Since the focus here is
on pan-ethnic commonality, we use the more general item with “other Asians” as the referent. The two
linked fate items are statistically very closely related, with a high correlation coefficient of 0.65. See id.
275. The Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficient is a statistic that captures the correlation
between the scale that is measured and some “true” underlying scale if respondents could be asked
about all possible measures of the underlying concept of interest; in this case the underlying concept
would be something akin to “Asian American commonality.” See Lee J. Cronbach, Coefficient Alpha and
the Internal Structure of Tests, 16 PSYCHOMETRIKA 297 (1951). The more items you have that ask about
the concept of interest, the higher this statistic; items that measure some other concept will bring
down the value of the statistic. See id. To the extent that our additive index asks about commonality
across four different venues—economic, politics, race, and culture—we should expect a lower alpha
coefficient than if we asked about, say, cultural commonality in four different ways.
276. Ramakrishnan et al., supra note 180, at 18–21.
277. Id.
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The relationship between a candidate CCI factor and individual measures of
commonality is even more clear-cut when we turn to self-reports of
discrimination. The specific item in the NAAS we examine here starts with the
prompt, “We are interested in the way you have been treated in the United States,
and whether you have ever been treated unfairly because of your race, ancestry,
being an immigrant, or having an accent.”278 Respondents are then asked if they
have ever been “unfairly denied a job or fired,” “unfairly denied a promotion at
work,” “unfairly treated by police,” “unfairly prevented from renting or buying a
house or apartment,” or “treated unfairly or badly at restaurants or stores.”279 In
total, about 39% of NAAS respondents reported having experienced unfair
treatment in at least one of these contexts. Figures 8 and 9 show the association
between unfair treatment and commonality by adding up these contexts of
discrimination.280 In both cases of pan-ethnic linked fate and our constructed
commonality scale, the relationship is very strong. It is clear from Figures 8 and 9
not only that Asian Americans report experiencing unfair treatment at high rates,
but also that such experiences are formative of a greater sense that Asian
Americans share a basis of commonality and a greater belief that their lot is
intimately connected with that of other Asian Americans.

278. Id. at 62.
279. Id. at 62–66.
280. On average, if NAAS respondents reported experiencing discrimination, they reported
experiencing it in more than one context (a mean level of 1.8 contexts of discrimination, to be
precise). See id. at 62–67 (asking questions concerning discrimination).
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The cumulative effect of this “first blush” check on the plausibility of
broadening our legal tests to include CCI factors like language isolation and
discrimination, while not probative, is certainly suggestive. Figures 8 and 9 suggest
that these CCI factors might indeed set the conditions under which a population
sharing a common racial label (“Asian American”) emerges into a CCI that merits
protection under the VRA. To recap this section of our Article, we have taken
multiple measures of shared interests among Asian Americans and examined the
extent of their association with politically and legally relevant factors. This largely
empirical effort to build a positive case for VRA protection for Asian Americans
is coupled to a normative defense in the next and final section.
V. RE-IMAGINING DEMOCRATIC INCLUSION
A. Summary of Argument
Voting rights scholar Pam Karlan calls on her fellow scholars to spell out an
“affirmative vision” of the right to vote.281 We have attempted to answer her call
in this Article by re-imagining the meaning of democratic inclusion in the context
of the complex, modern racial landscape. We have shown empirically that existing
voting rights laws meant to prevent the dilution of minority voting preferences
systematically fail to overcome barriers faced by Asian American voters.282 We
281.
282.

Karlan, supra note 193, at 35.
See supra Part III.
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have further shown that this failure excludes from consideration politically and
legally relevant interests that are shared among Asian Americans, despite strong
evidence of common interests along culturally defined lines.283
Prescriptions for the democratic exclusion of Asian Americans are usefully
guided by the question of how democratic institutions should be designed to strike
an appropriate balance between protection of minority interests and the
extraordinary diversity of the modern United States284 While our survey of the
legal scholarship proposing to bolster political equality is certainly not exhaustive,
we highlight the concept of “communities of common interests” as a promising
one that could capture the culturally defined attributes that bind together Asian
American subgroups of voters. This concept, which courts have selectively
recognized and inadequately theorized, can be usefully appended to the legal
analysis in section 2 minority voting dilution claims.
Although some federal courts have shown a willingness to recognize
common interests, they have rarely explained how they would do it.285 At the
doctrinal level, we propose that culture-based analysis should regularly enter
section 2 analysis of minority voting dilution. One possibility is that a CCI
demonstration, perhaps by using survey data, could relax the Gingles requirements.
For example, a CCI showing could be used to establish the requisite degree of
political cohesion even if Asian Americans do not vote “as a bloc” using the more
typical measures of bloc voting (for example, support for co-ethnic candidates as
opposed to non-Asian candidates). This showing could serve as confirmation that
a seemingly oddly shaped district drawn for the purpose of empowering Asian
American voters indeed delineates a politically coherent community deserving of
the special protections of the VRA, even if there are apparent failures on some of
the Gingles prongs.286

283.
284.

See supra Part IV.
See generally Richard H. Pildes, Voting Rights: The Next Generation, in RACE, REFORM, AND
REGULATION OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS, supra note 192, at 17 (examining how to promote
voting rights after the Voting Rights Act).
285. See LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 430–35 (2006); see also Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952,
961–65 (1996); Diaz v. Silver, 978 F. Supp. at 124–26 (E.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d, 522 U.S. 801 (1997).
286. A critic might respond that a CCI demonstration is irrelevant for purposes of
representation unless Asian American voters also act on the basis of their ostensibly common
interests when they vote. In this view, the commonality that matters for section 2 must be expressed
in the voting booth, not a commonality that survey researchers ascribe based on interests or traditions
that are not reflected in voting decisions. This is a strong objection. However, our notion of cohesion
as a process indicates that there may be circumstances where a community with shared interests does
not vote cohesively for reasons unrelated to their underlying commonalities. For example, electoral
neglect of Asian Americans can mean that neither of the leading candidates or neither of the political
parties seeks the community’s support. Under these circumstances, relaxing the cohesion requirement
can be justified normatively in terms of the U.S. Constitution’s race-neutrality norm and the
conception of political fairness implied by American electoral traditions. See HAJNAL & LEE, supra
note 175. It can be justified doctrinally in terms of foundational voting dilution cases such as Whitcomb
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The prior section hinted at ways that the legal concept of communities of
common interest might be operationalized for Asian American voters, presenting
multiple indicators of shared interests that speak to judicially recognized and
culturally based attributes:
 Language and shared institutions;287
 Socioeconomic status—education, employment, housing;288
 Immigration history;289
 Use of social services and common goods;290 and
 Experiences of discrimination.291
Another possibility is to rely on state law to supplement federal VRA
compliance. Under state law, CCI assertions are arising with increasing frequency
given the emergence of independent redistricting commissions that affirmatively
solicit citizen input into the redistricting process.292 The California Voting Rights
Act, for example, relaxes some of the Gingles requirements where CCI can be
established.293 Article XXI of the California Constitution enumerates “local
community of interest” alongside equal population and VRA compliance.294
California Special Master’s reports in 1973 and 1991 stated that “social and
economic interests common to a population of an area which are probably
subjects of legislative action . . . should be considered in determining whether the
area should be included within or excluded from a proposed district.”295 Although
the precise CCI factors remain difficult to identify a priori—due to the subjectivity
of the interests and boundaries of given identity categories—and significant
implementation details still need to be worked out, the California experiences
illustrate a way forward for using CCI in conjunction with traditional VRA

v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971), and White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973). We thank Chris Elmendorf
for offering this critique and prompting our response.
287. Diaz , 978 F. Supp. at 102.
288. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 426; Diaz , 978 F. Supp. at 124.
289. Diaz , 978 F. Supp. at 126.
290. Magpantay, supra note 167, at 768.
291. Diaz , 978 F. Supp. at 126.
292. CCIs are recognized in five state constitutions and seven other state statutes. Nicholas O.
Stephanopoulos, Redistricting and Territorial Community, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1424–25 (2012). They also
have been important in local government redistricting, the unit of government where Asian
Americans are most likely to meet requirements related to size and territoriality. Mac Donald & Cain,
supra note 49 (manuscript at 4–5).
293. See CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 14025–14032 (West 2003 & Supp. 2013). Although nothing has
been filed as of publication, there is some potential litigation brewing against the City of Santa Clara
under the California Voting Rights Act which relaxes some of the Gingles requirement on similar
theories. See E-mail from Angelo Ancheta, Member, Cal. Citizen’s Redistricting Comm’n, to authors
(Oct. 15, 2012, 07:15 PST) (on file with authors).
294. CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(d).
295. Mac Donald & Cain, supra note 49 (manuscript at 5 n.15) (citing California Court
Master’s reports).
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analysis.296 Similar strategies to bolster CCI consideration have been adopted
elsewhere at the local level where electoral districts are sufficiently small that intact
Asian American neighborhoods can form a majority under section 2.297
Apropos to the heterogeneity of the Asian American voting population, a
nuanced approach toward measuring these shared interests should be taken.
Undertaking a variety of data collection methods appropriate to each indicator is
an important undertaking, even if a labor intensive one. The UCLA Asian
Americans Redistricting Project 298 and the California Citizens Redistricting
Commission’s public testimony on CCI299 provide solid models for multimethod
data gathering and yield qualitative data that complements the quantitative data
currently used by federal courts in VRA cases. We also advocate the use of groupspecific databases and survey techniques exemplified by the NAAS when engaging
in more quantitative analyses of voting patterns and attempting to pin down
subjective aspects of common interests that necessarily tap public perceptions. As
well, the graded variables approach discussed in Part IV as a means of gathering
quantitative data about Asian American voters takes seriously variations in ethnic
self-identification along multiple dimensions rather than measuring race as a onedimensional, fixed, categorical variable.
Based on the preliminary data we have presented about Asian American
ingroup cohesion (linked fate, policy priorities, etc.)300 and out-group
differentiation (NAAS, UCLA, and original data analysis of CCI factors),301 we
think these approaches would be effective in strengthening the participation and
representation of minority voters in places where greater democratic inclusion is
needed and existing tests systematically fail. To make what may already be implicit
more explicit, we think that bolstering Asian American participation and
representation in electoral politics is normatively justified on grounds of
democratic inclusion, even if that is not our guiding objective. The remainder of
Part V elaborates on the normative justification of democratic inclusion. It then

296. Some of the implementation details include ordering by priority the factors to be
considered in redistricting when CCIs must be traded off with other formal criteria and fairness
outcome measures. This is the approach taken under the California Constitution. See CAL. CONST. art.
XXI, § 2(d)(1).
There is also the issue of how best to process the large volumes of public testimony that go
along with establishing CCIs in independent redistricting commissions that vest line-drawing
authority in citizens rather than politicians. Broader reforms could include clearer constitutional
criteria for CCI that include nationality and coalition groups. E-mail from Bruce Cain, Professor,
Stanford University, to author (Oct. 15, 2012, 04:02 PST) (on file with authors).
297. See, e.g., Ojeda-Kimbrough et al., supra note 167, at 6 (reporting on San Gabriel and
Koreatown in California); Susan French, Making Common Interest Communities Work: The Next Step,
37 URB. LAW. 359, 368 n.28 (2005) (reporting on Maryland state CCI analysis).
298. See sources cited supra note 243.
299. See Mac Donald & Cain, supra note 49 (manuscript at 16–21).
300. See supra Part IV, Figures 2–3.
301. See supra Part IV, Figure 4.
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broaches possible objections to bolstering democratic inclusion for Asian
Americans.
B. Justifications for Interest-Based Measures of CCI
The primary reason that we propose turning toward fine-grained notions of
common interests as a measure of political cohesion is that it befits the complexity
of modern racial politics. Our attempt in Part IV to define relevant political
interests apart from broad-based generalizations derived from historical
experience explains that isolating factors that legitimately unify voters within a
district fits with goals of the VRA. Setting aside the many different articulations of
what is and is not permissible in an increasingly convoluted VRA jurisprudence,
the emerging consensus is on the need to search for authentic forms of
representation that go beyond crude measures of racial classification.302
Shifting to interest-based factors also stands a better chance of being
accepted by courts in the post-Shaw and post-LULAC era of deemphasizing
overtly race-conscious classifications in redistricting and examining other bases of
group affiliation.303 That said, turning from race to “culture” and socioeconomic
status by disaggregating attributes correlated with racial politics is not without its
own risks. As we have seen in the context of affirmative action, culture can be
used to displace race.304 For example, the University of Texas’s “Top Ten Percent
Plan” was designed to base college admissions decisions to a greater extent on
class.305 By ensuring that the top 10% of students in each school district would be
admitted, the plan surmised, the admission of a more socioeconomically diverse
and more broadly representative set of students would result.306 Although race is
still considered as a factor in Texas admissions, the emphasis on class places
decreasing emphasis on race.307 The extent to which the inclusion of class implies
that race no longer needs to be considered in higher education admissions is

302. We also add that this pivot to a community of common interest approach does not imply
or entail an abnegation of historical experience and criteria derived from it. We do, rather, hold a
presumption that historically exclusionary laws and practices carry a silty residue into contemporary
laws and practices. Furthermore, we presume that laws and practices—both past and present—give
shape and stricture to the interests that individuals and groups hold.
303. See Lee, supra note 161, at 458 (discussing various processes for unpacking racial
categories as an alternative to older methods).
304. See Kennedy, supra note 197.
305. See Jonathan D. Glater, Diversity Plan Shaped in Texas Is Under Attack, N.Y. TIMES, June
13, 2004, at N1.
306. See id.
307. For example, William Julius Wilson’s The Declining Significance of Race (1978) was critiqued
for this implication. His own purpose in writing the book was to highlight the importance of class and
poverty, not to dismiss the ongoing relevance of race to issues of equality. WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON,
THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE: BLACKS AND CHANGING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS, at
ix–x (1978).
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currently under review in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin,308 but it does render
vulnerable race classification as we know it.
We are not arguing that race should be displaced as a legal consideration or
that the totality of the interest-based factors we identify captures the fullness or
complexity of racial politics. We are simply acknowledging the doctrinal reality
that it is difficult to use these measures post-Shaw. By highlighting dimensions of
race that relate to the formation of political interests and that serve the underlying
goals of section 2, we endeavor to capture something of value to minority voters
and acceptable to courts, even if there is sure to be a residual beyond what we can
capture with even the most sophisticated data or techniques.
As well, culture and socioeconomic status-based conceptions of common
interests can themselves be essentialized. Recall Ortiz’s characterization in Cultural
Compactness of the Supreme Court’s minority voting dilution cases as raising
objections on the basis of race essentialism.309 He says that, if Shaw can be
understood to say that we should not assume people of different racial groups do
not necessarily think and act differently, LULAC expresses the opposite concern
that we should not assume that people in the same racial group are all the same.310
Switching from racial to interest-based factors associated with cultural pluralism311
and group politics may avoid some of these overbroad stereotypes. However,
similar errors in thinking can be applied to interest-based notions of shared
interest that courts have so far recognized. For example, one could presume that
all Chinese American voters are the same on the basis of a shared written language
without taking into account differences in education and economic opportunities
that derive from their immigration histories. In reality, some Chinese immigrants
to America naturalized in the ethnic enclaves of the 1800s (for example, San
Francisco Chinatown), while others entered the country following 1965 largely

308. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (2012) (mem.), granting cert. to 631 F.3d
213 (5th Cir. 2011). As Thomas Espenshade said in anticipation of the Fisher oral argument,
supporters of race-conscious remedies are not optimistic that those remedies will survive in the
Supreme Court. Thomas J. Espenshade, Moving Beyond Affirmative Action, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2012, at
A25. Nevertheless, he thinks they shouldn’t despair. A ruling against race-conscious affirmative action
or redistricting “might put ethnic and racial diversity on a firmer footing for the long term. It would
spur Americans who care about racial inequality to seek alternatives to affirmative action by
addressing the deeply entrenched disadvantages that lower-income and minority children face from
the beginning of life.” Id.
309. See Ortiz, supra note 63, at 52 (“[The] danger is that increased sensitivity to diversity
within racial and gender groups might lead courts to question the salience of traditional racial and
gender categories.”).
310. Id. For more on in-group diversity as a justification for affirmative action, see Vinay
Harpalani, Diversity Within Racial Groups and the Constitutionality of Race-Conscious Admissions, 15 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 463 (2012); see also Brief for Society of American Law Teachers as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, No. 11-345 (U.S. Aug. 13, 2012).
311. Duncan Kennedy concludes his piece on cultural pluralism with an “objections” section
that addresses, inter alia, whether cultural pluralist understandings of American life derogate from the
individuality of group members. Kennedy, supra note 197, at 752–56.
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entered on student visas and high-skilled work visas that continue to shape their
opportunities as citizen voters.312 These two groups of Chinese American voters
may be less politically cohesive than ethnically distinct refugee groups such as
Vietnamese and Cambodians.
Mindful of these potential pitfalls, we contend with theoretical and empirical
support that the kinds of interest-based factors courts have identified show
promise as indicators that correlate with the political priorities of ethnic
subgroups. Rather than throwing out the baby (guarding against minority vote
dilution) with the bath water (race-conscious redistricting) because of concerns
about the crudeness of racial categories, we aim to replace it with something
“meaningful and workable.”313 It is in this spirit that we propose to refine the
categories and suggest ways to gather and assess data against those categories that
courts can readily administer.
C. Possible Objections
Even after being persuaded of the value of refining rather than dismissing
racial classifications in efforts to staunch minority vote dilution, objections may
remain. Three objections deserve particular attention, stemming from both
principled and pragmatic concerns. First, as a matter of legislative intent (a crucial
inquiry into the legitimacy of a proposal such as the one to focus on CCI factors),
is there is a risk of straying from the historical objectives of the VRA? If so, will
the CCI-related proposals that we endorse attract proceduralist objections?
Our starting point, to repeat, is that the current trajectory in federal courts is
to eliminate race-conscious classifications in redistricting based on the conceptual,
empirical, and doctrinal infirmities that have been described. If we cannot find
ways to make race under the VRA work better, it is at serious risk of being
eliminated and replaced with the colorblindness approach gaining favor in
Supreme Court jurisprudence.314 That, in our view, would be the greatest
departure from legislative intent. Short of that harsh outcome, our contention is
that the full legislative history of the VRA indicates Congress’s desire to address
equal opportunity in voting for multiple minority groups, including but not limited
to African Americans.315 Many of the justifications for including other racial

312. See IRIS CHANG, THE CHINESE IN AMERICA: A NARRATIVE HISTORY 33–34, 292–93
(2003) (discussing the differing circumstances under which generations of Chinese immigrants entered
the United States).
313. See Ortiz, supra note 63.
314. Id. at 52 (speculating that courts might “lose their stomach” for the whole enterprise of
racial analysis if forced to engage in detailed dissection of differences between groups).
315. As a matter of statutory interpretation, taking into account subsequent amendments to
legislation is accepted as a valid consideration in weighing legislative history of Congress’s intent. See
generally LISA BRESSMAN, EDWARD RUBIN, & KEVIN STACK, THE REGULATORY STATE 285–89
(listing amendments as relevant legislative history on which courts can rely); WILLIAM ESKRIDGE,
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minorities alongside black minority voters are shared: democratic theory cautions
against the tyranny of the majority and favors judicial intervention in instances of
political logjams, when the majority will cannot be accurately conveyed due to
systematic distortions in democratic process.316 Michael Kang and others have
described the purpose of elections as maintaining political competition, which is
thwarted when minority voters cannot effectively aggregate their votes.317 Baker v.
Carr’s principle of one person, one vote is violated when districting distorts the
articulation and aggregation of those votes.318
There are also independent justifications for Asian American democratic
inclusion. Part I indicated that language minorities and Asian Americans were
among the protected groups contemplated in the VRA at its inception in 1965.
That section included more background on Asian American political exclusion
and involvement in the civil rights movement, which challenges perceptions that
Asian Americans were not intended as beneficiaries of the VRA. The empirical
data that we presented in Part III suggests a stark asymmetry of Asian American
success in nonpolitical spheres of life versus rates of actual participation and
representation in voting. The empirical data that we presented in Part IV suggests
that there is both a common basis among Asian American voters and a shared
willingness to use political power to advance the interests of the group. Yet
presumably that willingness does not translate into action because of other
obstacles (for example, ongoing societal discrimination, such as white discomfort
with an Asian American political leader, problems with group formation and
mobilizing Asian American voters, problems connecting Asian American voters
with electoral and especially partisan politics, problems aggregating Asian
American voters into districts that register their shared political interests, and
problems overcoming structural obstacles by enabling Asian American voters to
avail themselves of the VRA minority voting dilution provisions as interpreted
under Gingles).319
Second, setting aside legislative history and congressional intent, what if our
proposals simply do not work as well for black voters? Black voters have an
unquestionably important place in voting rights law and have played a critical role
in securing legal protections for all minority voters.320 Historically, they held a key
role in securing civil rights laws, such as the VRA, that helped move society past a

PHILIP FRICKEY, & ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION 937 (3d ed. 2001). See also text
accompanying supra note 15.
316. See Michael S. Kang, Race and Democratic Contestation, 117 YALE L.J. 734, 794–800 (2008)
(discussing how coalition districts can distort the democratic process).
317. See id. at 764–73 (describing the difficulties in coordinating like-minded minorities).
318. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 207–08 (1962).
319. Thornberg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50–51 (1986).
320. See Pamela S. Karlan, Ballots and Bullets: The Exceptional History of the Right to Vote, 71 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1345, 1348–58 (2003) (discussing Black enfranchisement from the time of the Civil War
through the passage of the Voting Rights Act).
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shameful period of democratic exclusion.321 They continue to promote measures
that enhance the democratic ideals of our nation for all voters.322 Their success in
these efforts is justly captured in impressive political participation rates (for
example, the number of black voters who vote, and the election of black
politicians to office relative to other racial minorities).323
To this second objection: we do not aspire to supplant these successes, but
to build upon them. The CCI principles support application in cross-racial
coalitions. Black voters may, in some cases, find common cause with Latino or
other nonwhite racial minority voters such as Asian American voters, as was the
case in Prince Williams County, Virginia.324 There have also been several instances
where blacks and Latinos have joined forces on the basis of shared socioeconomic
status characteristics or common concerns about crime, poverty, and social
welfare.325 Similarly, Latino and Asian voters in a predominantly white district

321. See id.
322. See TATE, supra note 162, at 109–50 (1994) (discussing black voter turnout in the 1984
and 1988 presidential elections).
323. See id.
324. See Minnis, supra note 15, at 35.
325. The Supreme Court has not resolved whether two or minority groups in close proximity
can together form a district majority to surpass the Gingles test. In Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997,
1020 (1994), and Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 41 (1993), the Court assumed, without deciding, that
minority coalition groups may be used to establish a claim under the Voting Rights Act, while in
Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 13–14 (2009), it declined to address the issue. Meanwhile, lower courts
disagree, though the majority of circuits have resolved the issue in favor of minority plaintiffs. See, e.g.,
Bridgeport Coal. for Fair Representation v. City of Bridgeport, 26 F.3d 271, 276 (2d Cir. 1994),
vacated, 512 U.S. 1283 (1994); LULAC v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 864 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc);
Concerned Citizens v. Hardee Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 906 F.2d 524, 525 (11th Cir. 1990); Campos v.
City of Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240, 1241 (5th Cir. 1988); LULAC Council No. 4836 v. Midland Indep.
Sch. Dist., 812 F.2d 1494, 1496 (5th Cir. 1986), vacated on reh’g, 829 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1987); Arbor
Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass’n v. Cnty. of Albany, No. 03–cv–502, 2003 WL
21524820, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. July 7, 2003); France v. Pataki, 71 F. Supp. 2d 317, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1999);
LULAC v. N.E. Indep. Sch. Dist., 903 F. Supp. 1071 (W.D. Tex. 1995); Latino Political Action
Comm., Inc. v. City of Boston, 609 F. Supp. 739, 746 (D. Mass. 1985), aff’d, 784 F.2d 409 (1st Cir.
1986). But cf. Nixon v. Kent Cnty., 76 F.3d 1381, 1393 (6th Cir. 1996) (precluding, specifically, the use
of coalition minority groups to make out a section 2 claim); Debaca v. Cnty. of San Diego, No. 9255661, 1993 WL 379838, at *4–5 (9th Cir. Sept. 27, 1993) (holding that appellants failed to show
intentional discrimination against the entire multiethnic group on whose behalf the action was
brought); NAACP v. Snyder, No. 11-15385, 2012 WL 1150989, at *4–10 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 6, 2012)
(precluding the use of coalition minority groups to make out a section 2 claim); see also Badillo v. City
of Stockton, 956 F.2d 884, 890 (9th Cir. 1992) (discussing the issue but ultimately concluding that
“[w]hether a majority is required, or a dominant plurality is enough, makes no difference in the
outcome of this case”).
Even courts that approve of the idea of minority “coalition” districts, however, seem to be
demanding a relatively high standard—by way of hard evidence, as opposed to anecdote and
assertion—demonstrating the political cohesiveness of the coalition. See, e.g., Broward Citizens for
Fair Districts v. Broward Cnty., No. 12-60317-CIV, 2012 WL 1110053, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 3, 2012)
(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)) (granting motion to dismiss in part on grounds
that “the Amended Complaint fails to adequately plead political cohesion on the part of African
American and Hispanic voters, as required by Gingles’s second prong. The Amended Complaint
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might find common cause on immigration, language, or other policy issues based
on their recent immigration histories. Admittedly, it is possible to imagine that a
district that maximizes the electoral opportunity of black voters under Gingles
could be subsequently defeated under a CCI analysis. Usually, a valid grouping
under Gingles would not be defeated under the second layer of CCI analysis
because black voters share a history of racialization that shows itself in many
dimensions, including CCI factors of socioeconomic status, ideological leanings,
etc.326 In the rare occasion when a district fails under the CCI analysis, we have to
accept that the underlying grouping may not have been valid despite initial
satisfaction of racial prerequisites under existing tests. For example, AfroCaribbean immigrants and latter generation black voters who are slave
descendants may show distinct patterns of voting, even if there is research
showing the experience of racialization along the black-white color line is very
strong. Latino communities may be subdivided by class (for example, Rio Grande
versus Austin, Texas in LULAC )327 or partisan affiliation (for example, Cuban
Republicans and Mexican Democrats)328 and consequently be unable to trigger the
protections of CCI analysis. What these hypothetical scenarios show is that our

contains merely a bare assertion that African American and Hispanic voters ‘are politically cohesive,’”
and “[a] bare assertion of an element of a cause of action does not present ‘sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”); Texas v. United States, 831 F.
Supp. 2d 244, 268 (D.D.C. 2011) (“[T]here must be discrete data, by way of election returns, to
confirm the existence of a voting coalition’s electoral power. . . . Proving the existence of a coalition
district will require more exacting evidence than would be needed to prove the existence of a
majority-minority district as demonstrating past election performance is vital to showing the existence
of an actual coalition district. By contrast, a state creating a ‘new’ . . . coalition district simply
anticipates, or hopes, that the minority population in the new district will align politically and coalesce
with other groups of voters to elect its candidates of choice. It would be extremely difficult to
confirm that minority voters would indeed have the ability to elect in the newly formed district. . . .
[N]ew crossover-coalition districts . . . can rarely be deemed ability districts in a proposed plan.”);
Pope v. County of Albany, No. 1:11-CV-00736 (LEK/DRH), 2011 WL 3651114, at *4 (N.D.N.Y.
Aug. 18, 2011) (holding that “[d]iverse minority groups such as blacks and Hispanics may under
certain circumstances be combined to satisfy the Gingles precondition of political cohesiveness,” but
denying preliminary injunctive relief because “the Court cannot assume that blacks and Hispanics in
Albany County are politically cohesive because courts have found them to be cohesive in other
jurisdictions. Instead, the Court must make a local determination that blacks and Hispanics are
politically cohesive in Albany County”), aff’d, 687 F.3d 565 (2d Cir. 2012); Romero v. City of Pomona,
665 F. Supp. 853, 857 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (“The defendants contend that the hispanics and blacks do
not vote as one cohesive group and therefore must be considered separately in determining whether
each is a sufficiently large and geographically compact group. As will be discussed, the Court finds
that the hispanics and blacks do not vote as a cohesive group.”), aff’d, 883 F.2d 1418 (9th Cir. 1989),
abrogated by Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 914 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1990).
326. See generally MICHAEL DAWSON, BLACK VISIONS: THE ROOTS OF CONTEMPORARY
AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES (2001) (discussing a variety of ideological stances that
continue to shape black opinions today).
327. LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 432 (2006).
328. See R. Michael Alvarez & Lisa García Bedolla, The Foundations of Latino Voter Partisanship:
Evidence from the 2000 Election, 65 J. POL. 31, 37 (2003) (examining distribution of party identification
among Cubans, Mexicans, and other Latino voters).
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proposed supplementation of Gingles with a CCI analysis is not necessarily a
formula for maximizing descriptive representation of minority voters. It is meant
to support a more nuanced inquiry into the possibilities for representing the
legitimate, shared interests of political subcommunities that might otherwise be
missed under the existing VRA framework.
Third, does our proposal to supplement conventional VRA analysis with
CCI comport with the purposes of the VRA section 2, or is it simply an attempt
to stack the deck in favor of a singular minority group, particular party, or
minority candidate that has been “losing” in politics? Achieving a fixed end or
political outcome is not our goal. Our underlying theory resonates with Pam
Karlan and Guy-Uriel Charles’s contention that the VRA means to protect the
representational rights of minorities who systematically lose in politics.329 Charles
writes:
Is the telos of [s]ection 2 the removal of Jim Crow-like barriers to political
participation? If the racism is defined as or limited to racial animus, then
the conservatives are right that there is nothing left for voting rights
policy to vindicate. The Voting Rights Act has largely achieved this
purpose, and [s]ection 2 should only be preserved in the annals of
history. . . . [But] [f]rom an altogether different vantage point, one could
argue that the telos of voting rights policy is to ensure consequential
political participation by voters of color. Put differently, maybe voting
rights scholars need to articulate a right of political participation that is
unmoored to any conception of racial discrimination. . . . This might kill
the current [s]ection 2 framework, but we might have to kill [s]ection 2 to
save it.330
So the harm we aim to remedy is that permanent minorities—notably, but
not exclusively Asian Americans—systematically lose out on the opportunity to
elect their candidate of choice, who will in turn be responsive to the community’s
needs and represent the community’s interests, however defined. A right to a
formally recognized and protected means of expressing one’s political voice is
surely a bedrock principle of any legal framework for democracy. As theorists of
different stripes have persuasively argued, descriptive representation enables
democratic ends that range from the advocacy of “over-looked interests,” to the
attentiveness to inequality and power, to the achievement of substantive
representation, and to the aspiration to greater collective flourishing.331 In the

329. Charles, supra note 5, at 223, 226.
330. Id.
331. See Suzanne Dovi, Preferable Descriptive Representatives: Will Just Any Woman, Black, or Latino
Do?, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 729, 729 (2002) (explaining how democratic citizens should choose
descriptive representatives); Jane Mansbridge, Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent
Women? A Contingent “Yes,” 61 J. POL. 628, 628 (1999) (enumerating the various functions served by
descriptive representation). See generally ANNE PHILLIPS, THE POLITICS OF PRESENCE (1995)
(discussing descriptive representation in the context of women in politics); Jane Mansbridge,
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absence of meaningful representation and the accountability one expects to
accompany it, many issues do not even make the agenda let alone turn out the way
that one group may hope.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we have argued that the current law demonstrates
misunderstandings about “race,” “politics,” and how the two may be linked.
Encoding these confusions in voting law compounds the structural barriers that
keep minority voters from participating equally in politics. We attempt to redefine
racial politics conceptually for the modern, multiracial context and in light of more
nuanced and various data, more sophisticated methodologies, and measurement of
the subjective components of CCI factors through surveys, public testimony, etc.
While we based our examples around Asian Americans, a key constituent group
and a weak case in both social scientific and legal terms, ultimately, our
recommendations for greater democratic inclusion of Asian Americans have
implications that extend to all protected groups under the VRA.

Rethinking Representation, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 515 (2003) (examining alternative modes of
representation).

